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Abstract 
For years mechanisms have been implemented in attempt to improve aid effectiveness. The 
latest of these being the Paris Declaration established in 2005. However, years after the 
declaration there is little evidence of effective aid performance in Africa. Evidences of 
ineffective management of foreign aid are spread around Africa (Andrews 2009). Resulting in 
unintended effects like corruption and dependence on aid. Many of the unintended effects are 
associated with the way aid is administered from the donors, and therefore some of these 
negative effects may be minimized if the donors change their policies (Newby 2010).  
The Norwegian aid agencies lack an effective management tool to assist decision makers in 
making effective policies. Following the Paris declaration alone is not enough. The objective 
of this thesis was to develop a Dynamic Balanced Scorecard (DBSc) model and demonstrate 
how it can assist decision makers in finding a more effective way of managing aid in order to 
reduce poverty. DBSc is a useful tool in assisting decision makers in evaluating the 
consequences of their policies before implementing them by using experimental computer 
simulation models. DBSc is not yet adopted by the Norwegian agencies. Norad was presented 
as a case study and Zambia as an example where a DBSc approach was applied. The thesis 
focused on development aid the Norwegian agencies allocated to Zambia from 1991-2011 for 
stimulating economic growth, improving both education and health sectors. The policies are 
about aid allocation per sector and they were evaluated depending on their effectiveness. 
Today’s policies and other policy alternatives were evaluated. The analysis of today’s policies 
suggests that they are not effective, confirming what is already known. The results from other 
policy alternatives suggest that development aid should be allocated to all the three sectors as 
they all contribute to a sustainable economic growth. Unequal distribution of development aid 
is recommended where the economic sector receives the largest share because the expenses 
involved in creating employment is greater than for building schools and clinics. The 
education sector should receive more than the health sector because it is assumed that an 
educated work force earns a higher average salary which leads to more tax revenues. This in 
turn contributes to economic growth. Aid effectiveness could benefit from better prioritization 
at the country level. The Zambian government should prioritize their development plan 
according to the benefits from each sector and this will change the allocation policies in 
Norway as those policies are influenced by the Zambian development plan.  
Keywords: Balanced scorecard, system dynamics and development aid. 
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1. Introduction 
Can development aid be managed more effectively? Evidence of ineffective development aid 
is widespread in Africa. The debate on how aid can be effective in order to contribute to 
Africa’s development is still going on without any clear way forward (Andrews 2009). 
Despite the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness in 2005 (more of this is discussed in 
section1.3), the gap between developing and developed countries is still big. This gap has led 
to continuous aid inflow from developed countries to developing countries with the goal of 
stimulating economic growth and thereby reducing the gap. Unfortunately, there is evidence 
that decades of development aid has done little in changing the economic situation of many 
African countries (Andrews 2009).  
To illustrate this problem, Norad will be used as a case study and Zambia as an example. 
1.1 Norad as a case study and Zambia as an example 
Norad is a directorate under the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and part of the 
Norwegian development cooperation system. This system is composed of four organizational 
entities and each entity has its own responsibilities; 
1) The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is responsible for policy-making, -
decisions and the management of 62 percent of the aid budget (including funding to 
multilateral organizations),  
2) Embassies and delegations are responsible for managing 18 percent of the aid budget at 
country level,  
3) The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) is responsible for the 
management of 13 percent of the aid budget (most of which is allocated to the Norwegian 
NGOs),  
4) Norfund, the Peace Corps and the Office of the National Auditor manage 7 percent of the 
aid budget. 
Norad was chosen because it is Norway’s foremost body of specialists on development 
assistance, offering a combination of development aid expertise and sector expertise. The 
agency provides technical advice to all Norwegian aid agencies on all target areas of 
development policy. Norad is supposed to assures the quality of Norwegian development aid 
to all entities, communicate results, conducting independent evaluation of all activities funded 
by Norwegian development aid, and ensure that statistics on the use of development aid and 
information on results are available for the general public and to the entire aid sector  (Norad 
2011). 
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Zambia was chosen as an  example because despite all the quality assurance of development 
aid Norad is supposed to do, Zambia is the country that has received the largest share of 
Norwegian development aid through the last years and yet the country is considered to be one 
of the world’s least developed countries (UNDP 2011). Majority of the people suffer from 
weak purchasing power, homelessness, and insufficient access to basic necessities such as 
education, health, food, and clean water. Poverty is more prevalent in rural areas compared to 
the urban areas (83 percent and 56 percent respectively). Poverty is rising faster in urban areas 
due to failing industries and rising unemployment. 80 percent of the poor people reside in the 
rural areas and they are small-scale farmers. 
Norway has allocated a total of 6 279,753 million NOK in development aid to Zambia to 
reduce poverty from 1991- 2011, but 64 percent of the population is still below the poverty 
level, 33 percent of the adult population is considered to be illiterate, people are still dying 
from curable diseases like malaria, and HIV/ AIDS has affected the country greatly. Zambia’s 
demographic report (UNDP 2011). To demonstrate this problem, reference modes will be 
constructed to show when the problem started. Zambia receives development not only from 
Norway but also from other countries. The thesis will not consider aid allocated to Zambia 
from other countries, but only from Norway and the focus will be on three sectors; economic 
growth, education and health. 
1.2 Historical development of aid and its effects 
The historical development of aid and its effects will be represented in a graphical form on a 
two-dimensional block called a reference mode. It is an abstract concept that contains the past 
as well as inferred future behavior projected from the interrelated past trends. This section 
will only focus on reference modes featuring past behavior. The modes will be constructed 
based on the historical data from Norad for the total aid allocated to Zambia for the last 20 
years (1991-2011). The intention is to study the problematic patterns. These problematic 
behaviors are viewed from the manager’s perspective, in the sense that what is causing the 
observed problem is internal within the Norwegian development cooperation system structure. 
The purpose of viewing the problem this way is to be able to specify the rules of decision 
making in the system and explore the consequences of those rules. This will lead to an 
investigation to how the behavior might change if the structure of the rules is changed. The 
thesis will demonstrate how the system can be changed using a dynamic balanced scorecard 
approach later. 
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The focus in the thesis will be on the development aid allocated to Zambia through all the four 
entities of the Norwegian development cooperation system (MFA, Norad, Norfund and the 
embassy) for the development of economic, education and health sector. This is because it 
was difficult to find adequate historical data per entity. The data available for aid allocated 
through all these four entities is from 1991 to 2011. The time horizon for the reference modes 
will vary from 1991 to 2011 depending on the data available per sector.  
The first reference mode developed will show a general trend of the general total aid verses 
poverty level, and then three more reference modes will be created based on the aid allocated 
per sector (economic, education and health sector). The economic sector shows the pattern of 
the percentage of GDP per capita. The education sector portray the trend of the number 
students attending both primary and secondary school, and the health sector shows the trend 
of health expenditures by the government of Zambia.  
1.2.1 Reference mode, general total aid verses poverty level 
The graph below shows the trend between total development aid and the percentage of 
population below poverty level in Zambia in the period 1991-2006. Development aid has 
increased dramatically since 2001, from NOK 187,111 million to NOK 424,762 million, an 
increase of 227 percent. However, the poverty level has been decreasing at a low rate. As the 
figure below shows, Zambia reached its highest poverty peak in 1993 at 84 percent and it has 
been decreasing at a low rate since. There was a modest decline between 2004 and 2006, from 
68 percent to 64 percent, a decline of fire percent in poverty at the national level. This decline 
was mostly in the urban areas. The decline is relatively low compared to the increase in 
development aid. 64 percent is Zambia’s lowest level of poverty in 2006 but, this is still 
considered very high (Zambia Central Statistcal Office 2006). 
 
 
Figure 1.2.1a: Reference mode general total aid verses poverty level, 1991-2006 
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Poverty trend in Zambia is a product of lack of economic growth and the population increase, 
the population has been increasing since independence in 1964. According to the 1980, 1990 
and 2000 censuses the population of Zambia was estimated at 5.7, 7.8 and 9.9 million 
respectively. The annual average population growth rate has shown a decline from 4.4 in the 
1960 to 3.1 between 1969 -1980, to 2.7 percent between 1980 -1990 and 2.4 percent between 
1990 -2000 (UNESCO 2008). The population was mainly concentrated in rural areas at 61 
percent compared to 39 percent in urban areas. 
A reference mode is developed to show the population development trend from the 2000 - 
2011. As the figure shows, the population continues to increase even though the average 
population rate is falling. In 2000 the population was increasing at an average rate of 2.01. 
The average annual percent change in the population fluctuated a lot, the lowest being 1.52 
percent in 2003 and the highest of 3.06 percent in 2011(Index mundi 2013). Comparing the 
population growth rate for the last two decades, the average growth rate has decreased by 0.49 
percent between the periods 1990 -2000 and 2000 -2010.  
 
Figure 1.2.1b: Population growth 
 
The population continues to increase because the average birth rate is higher than the average 
death rate, 0.045 and 0.018 respectively. The data for birth and death rate for the last decade is 
shown in the table below. 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Birth 
rate 
0.045 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.046 
Death 
rate 
0.020 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.016 
Table 1.2.1c: Birth and death rate (Index mundi 2013). 
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A high birth rate with a slow economic growth contributes to the persistence of poverty in 
Zambia. Majority of the population are children under the age of 14 years of age. The age 
structure of the population is described in the table below. 
Age Percent Male Female 
0-14 46.3 3 210 553 3 183 169 
15-24 20 1 382 475 1 384 868 
25-54 28.5 2 042 023 2 009 511 
55-64 2.9 188 412 205 783 
65 and over 2.4 144 145 191 129 
Table 1.2.1d: Age structure (CIA 2013) 
 
Life expectancy of the total population in Zambia is only 52.57 years; male live until there are 
51.34 while female live 2.48 years longer. HIV/AIDs have contributed to this low life 
expectancy. The estimated number of children aged 0-14 living with HIV in 2009 was 
120 000. These children were born with HIV, mother-to-child transmissions could be 
prevented with proper treatment.  HIV is more dominant among the population aged 15-49, 
this group represents 13.5 percent of the population living with HIV/AIDs in Zambia (Unicef 
2013). 
 
1.2.2 Reference mode, effect of aid on the education sector 
 
Figure 1.2.2: Reference mode education sector, 1991-2006  
Development aid allocated to education has increased at an increasing rate since 1997 as the 
reference mode shows. On the contrary, the percentage of students attending both primary and 
secondary school did not increase as expected. The increase in the number of students in both 
levels is attained between 2004– 2006. According to Living Condition Monitoring Survey 
(LCMS), the highest percentage of attending primary school was 79 percent in 2006, and the 
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lowest of 57 percent in 2004. Secondary school had the highest attending rate of 37 percent in 
2006, and the lowest of 18 percent in 2004 (Zambia Central Statistcal Office 2006). The 
development aid from Norway for the education sector has some effect on the children 
attending primary school but more need to be done as still 21 percent of the of the children 
have no primary education. Secondary on the other hand, aid has little impact as 63 percent of 
the population has no secondary school education.  
The demand for education reduced greatly after the introduction of education fees in the 
1990s especially for middle and lower income population (UNDP 2011). One of Norad’s 
main goals is to provide free education to all children in Zambia, this goal is not achieved yet. 
The government of Zambia has not used a lot of resources on education in the last 20 years. 
The table below shows the expenditure budget for education by the Zambian government 
according to the data attained from the World Bank search. The resources are not enough to 
improve the education sector in terms of increasing the number of schools and ensuring the 
quality of education.  
Year % of government expenditure on education 
1998 17,6 
1999 6,9 
2000 6,4 
2004 14,8 
Table 1.2.2a: Government expenditure on education (The World Bank 2013) 
The education sector public expenditure review of 2006 concluded that Zambia has a low-
cost, low-quality education system especially at the primary school level. Other African 
countries spend on average as much as 30 percent of domestic revenues on education, 
compared to only 11.4 percent in Zambia. This low spending is a major setback for the 
education sector (UNDP 2011). 
The formal education is based on three-level system as viewed in the table below; 
Level Grades Age 
Primary school 1-7 7- 13 
Junior secondary 8 and 9 14- 15 
Senior secondary 10- 12 16- 18 
Table 1.2.2b: Education system (UNDP 2011) 
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Upon completion of secondary school, one may choose to continue with the education by 
attending a university, college, or a technical institute. This thesis focuses on education at 
primary and secondary level. 
Even though there have been some improvements in the number of students attending primary 
and secondary school the median years of completed schooling for the adult population is 
only six years which means that many Zambians have not achieved the required seven years 
of primary school (UNDP 2011).  
Efficiency indicators for schools. 
As the table shows, generally the completion rate 
of 21.9 at both primary and secondary schools is 
very low. The explanation for the bad results is 
poor quality of teaching and poor classroom 
structure. The recommended pupils per classroom 
per teacher are a maximum of 40 pupils, but this 
recommendation is not followed. A classroom has 
normally more than 40 pupils per teacher, thereby 
reducing pupil-teacher contact. 
Table 1.2.2c: Indicators (UNDP 2011) 
Another reason for poor performance is that learning achievements for pupils traveling long 
distances to school is reduced the longer the distance. Some of the development aid could be 
allocated for building more schools such that the students don’t have to travel long distance to 
school. 
The dropout rates are due to financial constraints of the lower income population, disabilities, 
and language and cultural barriers. 
Indicator Rate 
Transition rate grades 7-8 55,6 
Transition rate grades 9-10 38.2 
Completion rate grade 9 51.2 
Completion rate grades 1-12 21.9 
Dropout rate grades 1-9 2.2 
Dropout rate grades 10-12 1.1 
Repetition rate grades 10-12 1.5 
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1.2.3 Reference mode; effect of aid to the health sector 
 
Figure1.2.3: Reference mode health sector, 1995-2009  
The reference mode shows an oscillation pattern for both percentage of aid allocated to the 
health sector and the percentage of government health budget between 1995- 2009. The aid 
allocated was on average 5.07 percent. The government of Zambia health budget was on 
average 11.17 percent of the national budget even though the Abija Declaration target 
requires the governments to spend 15 percent of the nation budget on health. Comparing the 
trend of development aid to government health expenditure, the highest aid of 8.33 percent 
was allocated in in 1997 and a year later, the Zambian government allocated its highest 
budget expenditure of 14.4 percent attained in 1998. Further, Norway allocated its lowest aid 
in 2001 and 2009 of 3.13 and 3.14 respectively and that’s the same period the government of 
Zambia also had the lowest budget expenditure, 9.4 percent in 2004 and 2009. It seems like 
there is a correlation between the amount of aid allocated for the health sector and the amount 
of funds the government allocated to the sector. Comparing Zambia to other countries, 
Zambia’s budget expenditure is ranked as number 142 out of 189 on world ranking scale (CIA 
2013).  
The development of health budget is unfortunate because the budget influences a number of 
health facilities available in the country. The government of Zambia had a total of 1124 health 
facilities in 2000s (Picazo & Zhao 2009). There are 53 government hospitals. These hospitals 
are divided into levels (first, second and third) according to number of people they serve. The 
first-level hospital serves a population between 80.000 and 200.000. Second-level serves 
between 200.000 and 800.000, and third-level 800.000 and over. According to CIA, there are 
1,9 hospital beds per 1000 people (CIA 2013). This serves as a general measure of inpatient 
service available. There is no global target for the number of hospital beds per country, 
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because the inpatient services depend on several factors such as demographic and the 
seriousness of the disease. 
Total number of health centers was1052. These health centers are divided into two categories, 
urban and rural. Urban Health Centers (UHC) are intended to serve 30 000-50 000 people in 
the urban areas while Rural Health Centers (RHC) are to cater for 10 000 people within 29-
km radius. The target was 1 385, but only 1 052 where established. 
Number of health posts, 19. These posts were established with a five-km radius for sparsely 
populated area and the purpose was to cater for 3 500 people in the rural areas and 7 000 in 
the Urban area. The goal was to establish 3 000 health posts, but only 19 exist. 
It is not surprise that the government didn’t achieve its target goal of more health facilities 
since the health budget expenditure was lower than 15 percent which is recommended. Health 
services are important factors determining the level of human development. Prevention of 
diseases, timely and quality treatment are vital for sustainable healthy lives. A healthy 
population is generally more productive and employable (UNDP 2011). In 2009, 980 000 
people were living with HIV/AIDs. With proper treatment, these people would be productive 
members of the society by contributing positively to the work force. The country is also 
affected by other major infectious diseases which could be cured with proper treatment like; 
diarrhea, hepatitis A, typhoid fever, malaria and plague and rabies (CIA 2013). 
1.2.4 Reference mode, effect of aid on the economic sector 
 
Figure 1.2.4: Reference mode economic sector, 1993-2011.  
The figures for GDP per capita in Zambia were in US$, but were converted to NOK to get 
consistence in the units. The currency rate used to convert is six US$ per NOK. GDP per 
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capita has increased exponentially, but at a very low rate compared to development aid. The 
lowest GDP was NOK 188.94 in 1999 and the highest of NOK 855.18 in 2011. 
The slight increase in GDP per capita is mainly in the urban areas. GDP per capita for the 
majority of rural households in Zambia is relatively low because the majority of people 
depend on agriculture with low income levels (Zambia Central Statistcal Office 2006). 
The low growth of Zambia’s economy over the past thirty years is caused by the failing 
industries in the country. Mining, the driving force in the Zambian economy, declined for a 
long time, pulling down other sectors that depend on it. There is no major substitute for the 
mining industry in Zambia. This has resulted in unemployment and reduced ability of 
government to provide basic services like education and health. On top of that, HIV/AIDS 
pandemic and other diseases have worsened the poverty situation from the 1990s. This has a 
huge impact on the family’s economy, the health system and the general work force. The 
work force population (in 1000s) for the last decade is portrayed in the table below. 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Work 
force 
4290 3400 3400 4590 4630 4800 4903 4989 5235 5416 5524 
% 0.448 0.348 0.341 0.445 0.443 0.426 0.426 0.435 0.449 0.456 0.410 
Table 1.2.4: Working population (Index mundi 2013) 
On average 42 percent of the Zambian population are working. Unemployment rate has been 
high. The data available show unemployment rate of 25 percent in 1998 and a staggering 50 
percent in 2000, but it has reduced to 14 percent by 2006. 85 percent of the working 
population works with agriculture, 6 percent in the mining industry and 9 percent in the 
service sector (CIA 2013). 
The reference modes described above show patterns of when the resistance to the policy 
intervention started in the different sectors. The policies that lead to the observed behaviors 
are discussed below. 
1.2.5 Today’s goals and policies  
Poverty reduction is an overall goal of development aid. The Norwegian development 
cooperation follows the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) discussed in details in 
section 1.3. The intension of adopting these MDGs is to reduce poverty in developing 
countries. The thesis will be focusing on three of those MDGs;  
15 
 
 Provide education. Millions of children do not have access to basic education in 
Zambia and millions adults are illiterate because they have never got any education. 
They are all being deprived their basic human right: The right to education (Norad 
2011). In order to ensure that many children receive education, Norway offer 
development aid in terms of budget support to the government of Zambia for the 
education sector. 
 Promote economic development in order to reduce poverty and hunger. In order to 
achieve economic growth in Zambia, Norway provides support to the economic sector 
in terms general budget support to the government of Zambia and through different 
NGOs. The main focus of Norway is supporting good financial management in 
Zambia, such as building capacity in the Zambia Revenue Authority to enable them 
collect taxes from the mining industry. 
 Combat diseases. Millions of people in Zambia battle daily with diseases associated 
with poverty. Norway assist by allocating aid to the health sector through budget 
support to the government and via international organizations for improving health 
facilities, other social infrastructures and services, and water and sanitation. 
Development aid allocated per sector from 1991-2011 to achieve the above goals is as shown 
in the figure. The economic sector has received the largest share followed by the education 
sector. As discussed under the reference 
modes, these are not the most effective 
policies as they have little impact on reducing 
poverty in Zambia. The decisions behind 
these policies according to the Norwegian 
ambassador in Zambia Arve Ofstad are as 
follows; 
It is the Parliament that decides the allocation of the national budget and how much aid that is 
allocated to the various budget lines of development aid like health, education and economic 
development via the four entities of the Norwegian development cooperation system. Then 
the entities allocate aid to Zambia according to Zambia’s development plan. These policies 
are summarized in the table below. 
 
 
Economic
sector 58%
Education
sector 24%
Health sector
18%
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The Parliament decides the national budget and the allocation of development aid budget per 
country to the four entities of the Norwegian development cooperation. 
 
 
MFA Norad  Norfund  Embassy  
MFA manages the 
budget line for global 
health and programs 
that are channeled to 
the Zambian 
government. 
Norad manages aid 
that is channeled 
through NGOs to the 
government for 
economic 
development goals. 
Aid allocated to 
Norfund is also for 
economic 
development, but it 
does not go to the 
government but to 
projects. 
Manages the general 
budget support for 
poverty reduction 
which is used by the 
government for 
health, education, 
economic 
development and 
other goals. 
 
 
Zambia has its own goals for the development of different sectors based on the country’s 
development plan. 
Figure 1.2.5a: Policies in the Norwegian development cooperation 
The figure shows the decision structure of the Norwegian development cooperation system, 
showing how development aid is allocated today. The policies consist of both long-term and 
short-term projects/programs. The short-term policies are those where aid is channeled 
through NGOs and other organizations.  Each entity focuses on its own goal and 
projects/programs separately. According to my research, there is no coordination among the 
entities. The policies aim at reducing poverty by promoting economic growth. These policies 
have been implemented over the years to address the poverty problem, but poverty continued 
to persist. This is because the policy makers have no clear understanding of what causes the 
problem, and they don’t acknowledge that there are other actors in the system that has 
different motives that offsets the intended goal of the policies. These policies attribute poverty 
to outside factors as if they came to be as acts of fate. They also assumed that the system in 
which poverty appeared is static. This is why the decision makers expected that directly 
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attacking the symptoms would help alleviate poverty. Policies implemented with such a 
perspective produce unexpected results (Saeed 2003). 
How the decision makers in the Norwegian development cooperation think about the poverty 
problem is explained by their policies to improve the problem. They go through problem 
solving without considering the relationships between contributing factors, and they have no 
knowledge or opportunity of testing policies before implementing them. This leads to 
implementing ineffective policies. 
 
Another approach of viewing the way development aid is managed today is by using system 
archetype (generic structure) called “Shifting the burden”. This approach facilitates rapid 
understanding and diagramming of the Norwegian development cooperation system. Poverty 
persists despite repeated efforts to reduce it. This is because the underlying causes of poverty 
is either difficult to identify or impossible to address.  The poverty problem seems to require 
more and more of development aid. This is because the Zambian government has shifted the 
burden to aid agencies in Norway. Fighting poverty should be the Zambian government’s 
responsibility, but it is instead the aid agency’s responsibility. Since poverty is visible, the 
Norwegian development cooperation system is being pressured to improve the poverty 
situation in Zambia. To alleviate the pressure, Norwegian aid agencies to a certain extent 
focuses on the short-term goals which are easily measured like projects through different 
NGOs and other organizations as shown in the figure 1.2.5a above. This approach has its side 
effects; people became dependent on development aid, assuming it will always be available 
and reliable, and it promotes corruption (these side effects are discussed in details in selection 
2.4.1). Because of focusing on short-term policies, the attention is not given to the underlying 
sources of the problem and therefore the implementation of more fundamental policies is 
postponed or ignored. This discussion is illustrated in the figure below. 
The figure consists of two balancing loops and one reinforcing loop. Determination of the 
polarities of these loops is explained in details in section 2.2.1. The upper balancing loop 
represents the short-term policies as discussed above. Short-term policies reduce the 
symptoms of the problem.  
The lower balancing loop shows the dynamic of the correcting process of the poverty problem 
through long-term policies which improve the fundamental problems of poverty which are 
illiteracy, diseases and low economic growth in Zambia. The long- term policies are investing 
18 
 
in building more school, health facilities like clinics and promote economic growth through 
tax revenues. These policies can reduce the poverty problem, but they usually contain a delay, 
indicating that it take longer time from when the policy is implemented to have an impact or 
see the results of the policy.  
 
Figure 1.2.5b: Shifting the Burden (isee systems 2006) 
The third loop which is a reinforcing loop represents the unintended effects of development 
aid like dependency and corruption. This loop is linked to the long-term loop, the one that 
focuses on the fundamental problems, to show the dynamics generated by the short-term 
policies on the fundamental policies. Short-term policy lead to increased corruption and 
dependence and these unintended effects reduce the implementation of the fundamental 
policies. 
Systems thinking can improve policy making and inspire organizational learning. Applying 
the Balanced Scorecard approach to the complex poverty problems will inspire collective 
learning and improvement in Norwegian agencies policy making. System dynamics will be a 
Focus on short-term
policies through
NGOs and other
organizations
Problem
symptom which
is poverty
Focus on
fundamental
problems; illitracy,
diseases and low
economic growth
Side effects;
dependency
and corruption
+
+
-
+
-
-
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useful tool to help decision maker acknowledge that everything is connected to something 
else and therefore, one cannot make changes in one area without affecting all the others. 
Policies made for one sector influences the other sectors. The three sectors are interconnected 
and influence each other as discussed in more detail in section 2. The economic sector 
influences both the education and health sector, and in turn the education and health sector 
influences the economic sector. The interconnectedness is as follows;  
Increased economic growth leads to more funds allocated to the education sector. More 
schools are built which leads to more students that graduate. These graduated students 
increase the work force which increases tax revenue and thus more economic growth. 
As with the education sector, increased economic growth means that the government has 
more resources to allocate to the health sector. This leads to more health facilities for example 
clinics. More clinics mean that more people are treated and therefore more health people who 
contribute positively to the work force. Again, increased work force increases the tax revenue 
which boots the economic growth. This interconnectedness is not acknowledged by the 
Norwegian development cooperation system today and therefore difficult to make effective 
policies. Policies must adopt a problem-solving approach in a mathematical sense if it is to 
achieve its intention of reducing poverty. With this approach, a problem must be defined as an 
internal behavioral tendency found in a system and not as a snapshot of existing conditions 
(Saeed 2003).  This approach will be more discussed later. But first, let’s look at one of the 
mechanisms aimed at improving aid effectiveness. 
1.3 Institutional responses 
Over the years, institutions have developed different mechanisms to improve the effectiveness 
of development aid. This section introduces one these mechanisms, the Paris declaration 
which was established in 2005 to improve the ways aid is managed today. The intension is to 
manage aid effectively in order to reduce poverty in the developing countries.  
1.3.1 Paris Declaration (OECD 2005) 
In March 2005, senior officials from over one hundred aid receiving countries and donor 
agencies met in Paris to take concrete steps to increase the effectiveness of aid. The main task 
of the Paris Declaration was to put in place a series of specific measures for implementation 
and establishes performance indicators for assessing progress. The uniqueness about Paris 
declaration is that it encourages an international monitoring system to ensure that donors and 
recipients hold each other accountable. Five fundamental principles for making aid more 
effective were established; 
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Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for development, improve their 
institutions and tackle corruption. 
Alignment: Donor countries bring their support in line with these objectives and use local 
systems. 
Harmonization: Donor countries co-ordinate their action, simplify procedures and share 
information to avoid duplication. 
Managing for results: Developing and donor countries focus on producing and measuring 
results. 
Mutual accountability: Donor and developing country partners are accountable for 
development results. 
It is believed that implementing these principles, there will be major improvements in 
improving aid effectiveness and thus reducing the unintended effects that has hampered the 
development of many developing countries for decades. 
It was agreed upon during the Paris declaration that the above principles should be applied to 
the United Nations (UN) Millennium development goals (MDGs) which were officially 
establish in the year 2000.  
1.3.2 Millennium development goals (MDGs) 
World leaders from 193 United Nations member states and at least 23 international 
organizations made a commitment at UNs millennium summit in 2000 to work together to 
reduce extreme poverty and promote development in the developing countries. The goal was 
to achieve the MDGs by the year 2015 (UN 2000). 
MDGs are eight international development goals and they are as follows;  
 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
 Achieve universal primary education 
 Promote gender equality and empowering of women 
 Reduce child mortality rates 
 Improve maternal health 
 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
 Ensuring environmental sustainability 
 Develop a global partnership for development 
The agreement concluded that in order to achieve the MDGs, the developing countries had to 
take the primary responsibility of achieving these goals. Donor countries’ responsibility was 
to support a global partnership for development. Support includes increasing the effectiveness 
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of aid, and to increase the quantity of aid to developing countries. Effectiveness of aid means 
ensuring that aid helps developing countries out poverty. The Norwegian development 
cooperation system follows these MDGs and the Paris declaration. A survey was carried out 
in 2008 to evaluate the effect of the Paris declaration. The results are discussed in the next 
section.  
1.3.3 Survey about the effects of Paris declaration (OECD 2008) 
After three years of Paris declaration on Aid effectiveness reform, OECD conducted a survey 
in 2008 to evaluate the effect of Paris declaration on MDGs in developing countries. The 
survey concluded that some developing country governments and civil societies had put the 
Paris Declaration principles into action and they were gaining the rewards in form of better 
effective managing of aid, better aligned and more predictable donor support. Many donor 
countries were also channeling aid through budgetary support to the governments in 
developing countries. 
However, providing aid through budgetary support has been criticized. Hilary Benn, a former 
UK secretary of state for international development commented in the OECD rapport (2008, 
p.13) that “giving government support is like writing a blank cheque encouraging corruption 
and inefficiency” She suggests that aid is best spent through Non- Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), but this approach has its critiques; NGOs ignores governments plans 
and create parallel systems, this is not a long-term solution to corruption nor a sustainable 
path to development. There is evidence that project aid through NGOs undermines aid 
effectiveness, distorts priorities and resource allocation, increases budgeting, reporting and 
audit demands, and weakens mutual and domestic accountability (OECD 2012). Norway 
operates with both systems of allocating aid through budget support and through NGOs. None 
of these approaches are effective as discussed above, is there another approach to manage aid 
effectively? Before investigating other ways of managing aid effectively, it is interesting to 
know how the public through media perceive the effects of aid. 
1.4 Perception of the effects of aid the media 
Does development aid do more harm than good? Is the question that has been extensively 
discussed over the years; the effects of development aid, and the extent to which aid has been 
effective in stimulating economic growth and thus alleviating poverty. NRK viewed a series 
of documentary “Den gode vilje” which first aired on 08.01.13. The intention of the series 
was to analyze how the effects of development aid are perceived from two different parts of 
the world; respondents from developing countries receiving aid, and respondents working 
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with development aid from Norway. Most of the respondents from developing countries 
argued that aid has weakened their governments and their civil societies by making them 
dependent on aid and awarding corrupt government officials. This means that the public 
doesn’t see any change in aid effectiveness despite the seven years of Paris declaration (NRK 
2013, 8.januar)! The kind of argumentation from the respondents is not new! Zambian 
economist and author Dambisa Moyo wrote a book “dead aid” and she has appeared on 
several media channels participating in debates. She is asking the donor countries to stop 
giving aid to African countries because it`s not working. She urges that aid does more harm 
than good; aid has led to widespread corruption, bureaucracy and inflation, laziness and 
inertia, and it hurts exports. All of these negative effects undermine growth. Moyo argues 
further that the economies of those countries that are most dependent on foreign aid have 
shrunk by an average of 0.2 percent per year ever since the 70s (Moyo 2009). 
 
The idea of stopping aid completely as suggested by Moyo is so dramatic. Aid can reduce 
poverty and inequality, and increasing growth, but aid effectiveness is critical to maximize the 
impact of aid and to achieve the necessary changes for long-term sustainable development 
(OECD 2012). From my experience of working in the development aid agency, aid has 
improved schools and clinics across Africa, and health sectors which provide the HIV 
antiretroviral, malaria and TB programs, along with emergency food supplies on which 
millions of lives depend. Aid is a “double-edged sword”, it supports development if managed 
effectively and aid will be wasted if not (Andrews 2009). Many of the negative effects 
associated with development aid are connected to the ways aid is administered, and therefore 
some of those negative effects can be minimized if donors adjust their approaches.  
The purpose of the thesis is to demonstrate how a dynamic balanced scored can assist decision 
makers in exploring new ways of managing development aid more effectively and thus 
changing the decision structures of their systems. The research question is about exploring the 
dynamic balanced scorecard approach and this is discussed in the following section. 
1.5 Problem statement  
Despite the Paris declaration, the citizens of many developing countries doesn’t recognize the 
effectiveness of aid as discussed in section 1.4 as many of them still live below the poverty 
level. Paris declaration has established measures of performance and indictors for assessing 
progress which is part of the Balanced Scorecard approach, but the process is missing the 
interconnectedness of various aspects which is an important element in BSc approach (this 
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will be discussed in details in section 2). There is no coordination among the entities of the 
Norwegian development cooperation system and development aid is transferred based on 
Zambia’s development plan and not based on the effectiveness of the policies. With today’s 
policies according to the data from Norad, 58 percent of the aid budget between 1992-2011 
was allocated to the economic sector, 24 percent to the education sector and 18 percent to the 
health sector. Is this the most effective way of allocating aid funds? Well, as discussed earlier 
it is not! Unfortunately, it is difficult for decision makers to know which policies that works 
since aid transferred to the different sectors is not evaluated. Even though Norad has the 
responsibility to carry out evaluations for all development aid from Norway. These missing 
links limit the learning process because the policies and their consequences are not evaluated 
and therefore difficult to learn from past experiences in order to improve aid effectiveness.  
 
For these reasons, it is worth to investigate the use of another management tool. A dynamic 
BSc will be developed in order to demonstrate how it can assist decision makers to gain 
insight in the complexity development aid allocation aimed at reducing poverty.  The research 
questions are about developing and demonstrating the use a BSc together with simulation 
models in order to operationalize the interactions of the different sectors that are receiving 
development aid.  
The thesis will demonstrate how the application of a Dynamic Balanced Scorecard (DBSc) to 
development aid can be an effective tool in assisting decision makers in managing aid 
effectively so that the percentage of the population under poverty level decreases in Zambia. 
i) How do the three sectors influence each other? 
ii) Aid is a scarce resource and therefore it should be allocated where it is most 
effective. How should it be allocated among sectors? Equal or unequal 
distribution? The thesis will study the consequences of the different policies 
for each sector. 
iii) Which policy(s) seems more effective in reducing poverty?  
These questions will be addressed by using a system dynamics based implementation of the 
balanced scorecard as discussed later.  
Development aid problem is a societal problem and it is also defined as a “wicked” or 
“tricky” problem because there is no solution to such problems, the best that can be done is 
re-solve - over and over again (Rittel & Webber 1973). The purpose of the thesis is not to find 
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a solution, but to investigate whether a better understanding of the dynamics of development 
aid and better analysis tools can improve the effectiveness of aid.  
Before addressing the research questions, the literature view will be discussed first. It gives a 
short presentation of the Balanced Scorecard framework, System dynamics and development 
aid. 
2. Theory/Literature  
The literature review is used to discuss the application of the Balanced Scorecard (BSc) and 
System dynamics, and effective management of development aid. The conclusions from the 
literature review will be used to explain why the research questions in the thesis are 
interesting by showing the gap between the available literature and research questions. This 
section will also review the research methods that can be used to analyze the impact of the 
suggested policies of allocating equal or unequal aid among sectors. The balanced Scorecard 
approach is discussed first. 
2.1 Balanced Scorecard   
Balanced scorecard (BSc) will be used to address the first research question “how do the three 
sectors influence each other?” BSc is about creating a set of measurements for performance 
where the focus is mainly on management of a few key measures of the strategy. BSc 
originates from USA from the field of Management Accounting, where measuring 
performance was based on quantitative financial measures only, this approach was not 
adequate (Kaplan & Norton 1992). Kaplan recognized a need for balancing presentations of 
both financial and operational measures. This approach serves as a bridge between different 
areas. It complements the financial measures with operational measures on different aspects 
of an organization. BSc puts strategy and vision of the organization in the center and then 
establishes goals (financial, customer, internal business and learning and growth) that 
contribute to the achievement of the desired vision. It is assumed that people will adopt the 
necessary behaviors and take necessary action to achieve those goals. In other words, BSc 
translates the vision and strategy into objectives and measures. BSc is based on the system 
thinking approach which focuses on the interconnectedness of various aspects in an 
organization. System thinking is the ability to see the world as a complex system, in which we 
understand that all different aspects and functions of an organization are interrelated. Because 
of this interconnectedness, one cannot improve one area without influencing all the others. 
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Understanding the interrelationships of different aspects, help managers to improve their 
decision making. 
 
Figure 2.1: Balanced Scorecard Framework (Kaplan & Norton 1996). 
As figure 2.1 shows, the performance measurements for each goal is viewed in four different 
ways; 
1) The financial perspective is about a company focusing on how they are viewed by 
their shareholders in order to achieve their financial goals which are normally 
measured in return of capital employed, economic value added, sales growth, cash 
flow. 
2) The customer perspective is about how the company wishes to be viewed by its 
customers in order to achieve their vision. Measurements for customer are customer 
satisfaction, retention, profitability and market share. 
3) The internal business process perspective is concerned with which processes the 
company must excel at in order to satisfy its shareholders and customers. The 
measurements for this perspective could be innovation and improving product or 
service quality.  
4) The organizational learning and growth perspective is about which changes and 
improvements the company must achieve to implement its vision. This includes 
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measurement for employee retention, training skills, morale, and information 
availability. 
A modified version of the above BSc framework will be developed for the development aid 
sector in section 2.1.2. Measures of performance for reducing poverty will be developed in 
section 2.1.3 and these measures will be linked together in a causal diagram to show the 
interrelationships between the sectors. Before developing a BSc for development aid, let’s 
first discuss how the Norwegian development cooperation system manages aid today 
compared to the balanced scorecard literature. 
2.1.1 Management of development aid today 
Figure 2.1.1 below shows the key sectors in the fight against poverty as discussed earlier, it’s 
an aggregated diagram of Norwegian development cooperation system today discussed in 
section 1.2.5. Development aid is managed in a traditional way of a simple linear relationship 
of cause and effect closely linked together in time and space. This is referred to as Laundry 
List Thinking or Factors Thinking (High Performance Systems Inc 1994). The arrows run 
one-way; development aid is given to education-, health- and economic sector and poverty is 
expected to be alleviated. But unfortunately, the real world is not that simple. Development 
aid is a dynamic complex issue that consists of non-linear relationships and time delays. The 
sectors as shown are not connected in any way which means that there are no collaborations 
among the sectors. Further, the system does not recognize the feedbacks within the system.  
In order for Norad to give effective advice to decision makers, it is important to understand 
the relationships between the sectors and not just a sector as an independent element, the 
holistic view is vital. Fighting poverty is an increasing challenge with decreasing resources. 
There is therefore a need for a better way of analyzing the development aid challenges. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1.1: Traditional linear relationship  
Economic 
sector 
Education 
sector 
Health 
sector 
Level of 
poverty 
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There are some criticisms about the way development aid is managed today.  
First of all, the policies of allocating development aid funds are not based on the effectiveness 
of the policies, but on the development plan of the Zambian government according to the 
Norwegian ambassador in Zambia. On top of that, there is no coordination among the three 
sectors as the figure shows. The decision makers in each sector are specializing in their own 
sectors limiting an integrated effort to reduce poverty. 
Further, these policies are not evaluated. According to the overview of Norwegian evaluations 
on Norad’s webpage, no evaluation has been done for the economic, education and health 
sector in Zambia. Norad has been criticized by the external evaluation department for not 
following up the evaluations (Rand Europe AS 2013). This means that the decision makers do 
not have an overview of which policies that works and which doesn’t work as they cannot 
evaluate the consequences of their decisions and therefore cannot learn from the past 
experience and thus no improvement in their policy making.  
The ministry of foreign affairs has also been criticized by the Norwegian office of National 
Auditor for lacking supervision and control of aid funds to ensure that they are used as 
intended (Riksrevisjonen 2012).  Lack of control from the aid agencies can lead to unintended 
results like dependence and corruption, a well-known problems among many African 
countries receiving development aid. The majority of the citizens of development aid recipient 
countries, blame uncontrolled aid funds for weakening their governments and making then 
dependent on aid and for awarding corrupt government officials (NRK 2013, 8.januar). 
Corruption and dependence are discussed in details in section 2.3.1.  
The Norwegian agencies have not developed adequate results based methodologies to 
improve accountability and the effectiveness of aid, no system is in place to monitor the 
results. There is no common understanding of what results can realistically be expected or 
how these will be measured. This was enlightened during data collection. Five decisions 
makers in the Norwegian development cooperation were contacted requesting for the key 
performance indicator per sector and the question asked was “how are the results for the 
economic, education and health measured?” none of the five decision makers provide that 
information, it was assumed that they didn’t know the answer. 
The section that follows discusses the development of BSc for the development aid sector. 
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2.1.2 BSc development for development aid sector 
The desired way of management thinking is a causal relationship whereby each sector is both 
cause and effect. This is a shift from static orientation discussed above to a more dynamic 
orientation management. The circular causal structure is a characteristic of the Balanced 
Scorecard (BSc). BSc is adopted in many companies from different fields (Kaplan & Norton 
1992), but it’s not fully adopted in the development sector. Studies show that BSc is not 
applicable to humanitarian aid, but can be applied to development aid. These are two different 
forms of development aid mechanisms.  
 
Humanitarian aid is defined as material or logistical assistance provided 
for humanitarian purposes, typically in response to humanitarian crises including natural 
disaster and man-made disaster. The primary objective of humanitarian aid is to save lives, 
alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity. It may therefore be distinguished 
from development aid, which seeks to address the underlying socioeconomic factors which 
may have led to a crisis or emergency (Wikipedia 2013). 
 Jan Wulf studied the application of BSc to the humanitarian sector and concluded that the 
approach is not applicable to the system-wide management in humanitarian aid. This is 
because the Balanced Scorecard framework works on the implicit assumption that all aspects 
of performance are measurable to a certain extent. The humanitarian sector shows 
characteristics that make it nearly impossible to measure the contribution of humanitarian 
interventions to the overall mission to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human 
dignity (Wulf 2012).  
 
Another study about application of the BSc to humanitarian sector was carried out by Fitz-
Gerald and Neal. They also concluded that BSc is not applicable to humanitarian aid because 
BSc is about interconnectedness of different aspects and this interconnectedness is impossible 
to achieve in humanitarian sector. As mentioned earlier, humanitarian aid focuses on helping 
people in areas affected by natural disaster and conflicts. Because of these disasters, a huge 
number of people are displaced, deterioration of health of many people, limited access to 
food, water and shelter. This put pressure on the international donors to provide funding 
rapidly. In response to such diverse needs, development aid is allocated into these areas 
through numerous different players, each with different core competencies. These 
organizations range from multi-international organizations to local NGOs all specializing in 
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different fields. Coordination between these numerous actors to provide a more integrated 
effort is impossible (Fitz-Gerald & Neal 2001). 
 
The purpose of the thesis is to focus on the long-term development aid where the policies are 
intended to promote sustainable economic growth. BSc will be developed and the key 
performance measures for each sector will be identified. Only policies concerning the 
allocation of development aid from the Norwegian aid agencies will be considered as they are 
adequate for explaining the persistence of poverty in Zambia. Development aid is a complex 
issue. It involves nonlinear, multiple interacting feedback loops as shown in the figure 2.1.2 
below. The arrows runs both ways which means that it is difficult (if not impossible) to 
change one area without influencing all the others. As a result, many variables change 
simultaneously leading to changes in the system behavior. The problem also involves time 
delays between taking a decision and noticing its effect of the system, this creates instability 
in the dynamic system. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1.2: Interconnected relationship, BSc approach 
Saeed carried a study where a dynamic BSc was applied to a developmental problem of rural 
poverty in Pakistan. The intention was to find an explanation to why public policies that were 
intended to reduce rural poverty in Pakistan didn’t work. The failure of the public policy is 
often attributed to the unforeseen events that occur over the course of implantation of a 
development program. The analysis was based on a dynamic BSc model that incorporated the 
income distribution process of the country’s economy which consists of a capitalist and a self-
employed farmer’s sector. Different policies were assessed and the study suggested that the 
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absence of an economic force that encouraged land ownership by its cultivators was a key 
factor responsible for poverty persistence in the rural areas. Land was easily separated from 
the farmers and was concentrated among the few capitalist households. This concentration 
significantly reduced income of the self-employment farmers and left them with very little 
bargaining power for negotiation compensation for their labor. The development policies 
striving to increase productivity only served to increase income of the few capitalist 
households, leaving incomes of the poor majority unchanged or worse. This is because the 
farmers often have to give up a large share of their production to the land owners. The study 
concluded that a development policy for alleviating poverty should simultaneously 
incorporate fiscal instruments to encourage transfer of land ownership from capitalists back to 
its cultivators and provide technological means that help increase the productivity of land 
(Saeed 1982). 
Saeed’s study proves that a dynamic BSc is applicable to development aid. The thesis will 
focus on evaluating the different policies aimed at reducing poverty. This will assist the 
decision makers in the Norwegian agencies to understand why today’s policies are not 
working and how they can be improved. It is important for the Norad’s advisory team 
understand the structure of the system. This will enable them to identify the key measures of 
performance which are useful in evaluating the policies. Applying balanced scorecard will be 
a suitable tool to enable the study of few key performance measures per sector and study how 
these sectors influence each other. This will lead to the designing of more effective policies 
aimed at reducing poverty.  
The advantage with the BSc approach is that it links key performance indicators together in a 
causal loop diagram which provides a way for decision makers to externalize their mental 
models and assumptions. BSc forces decision makers to explore the beliefs and assumptions 
which underpin their strategy. 
Another advantage of BSc is that it suggests that only a few key performances measures 
should be used to measure the performance. This makes BSc approach easy to apply as few 
measures are monitored. 
The performance measures and the linkages between these sectors are discussed in section 
2.1.3 and 2.2.1. 
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2.1.3 Key performance measure 
Key performance measures are indicators used to evaluate the success of activities. These 
indicators are driven from the Norwegian development cooperation’s goal of reducing poverty 
through focusing on different sectors in Zambia. The sectors which are focused on in the 
thesis are: education, health and economic sector. The Key performance indicators (KPI) per 
sector are viewed in the table below.  
Education sector 
 
Health sector 
 
Economic sector 
 
 Number of schools 
 Number of students 
completing primary 
and secondary school 
 Level of general 
knowledge 
 
 Number of health 
facilities, these will be 
represented by 
number of clinics 
 Number of sick 
people 
 Level of health 
 
 Tax revenue 
 Development aid  
 Number of workers 
 
Table 2.1.3: Key performance indicators (KPI) 
According to the Balanced Scorecard approach, managers don’t have to monitor dozen of 
performance indicators, but just focus on the few important key performance indicators for 
each sector to measure the effect of development aid. 
These KPIs will be used in the development of the Causal Loop Diagram (CLD). The 
linkages between these KPIs are shown in CLD in section 2.2.1. The linkages will also be 
discussed in the same section. Before discussing the CLD, let’s look at some of the limitations 
of the Balanced Scorecard approach.  
2.1.4 Limitations of the Balanced Scorecard (BSc) approach 
Despite the popularity of the Balanced Scorecard concept, it is not without criticism. With 
BSc approach, manager need to monitor few key performance indicators (KPIs) as mentioned 
earlier. The weakness with this approach is that it is not certain that those few selected KPIs 
are the right ones or that they target the right values in the right time frame (Akkermans & 
Oorschot). This leads to question of the validity of the BSc approach. Validity requires the use 
the correct measures for the case being studied.  
A second critique of the BSc approach is that causal loops do not distinguish between stocks 
and flows variables. Because of this the loops do not capture whether the key variables are 
accumulating or depleting. To know whether the key variable stock is increasing or 
decreasing one must know the net rate of change (Sterman 2000). Because the causal loop 
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does not identify stocks and flows, it is difficult to capture time delays which are critical in 
creating the dynamic behavior of the system.  
These limitations of BSc approach are solved by applying System Dynamic (discussed in the 
next section) to the approach creating a Dynamic Balanced Scorecard (DBSc). 
2.2 System Dynamics (SD) 
System dynamics will address the second and the third research questions. System dynamics, 
an approach to thinking that facilitates problem solving pioneered in the 1950s by Jay 
Forrester, an engineer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Forrester introduced 
computer simulation as a business problem-solving tool and taught leaders in business, 
government, academics, and other disciplines how to look for the unintended consequences of 
policies before they are implemented. System dynamics was first applied when Forrester 
worked for to General Electric in the 50s. The company was struggling to find an optimal 
hiring schedule to their plants. Forrester investigated the hiring and inventory policies and 
built a simulation model. From the given policies the company followed, one could decide 
how many people would be hired in the future. This gave a new condition of employment, 
inventories and production. Since then, system dynamics is widely applied in many fields 
(Forrester 1989). According to my research System dynamics is not yet adopted by the 
Norwegian development cooperation system. 
System dynamics is a method that reinforces learning in the complex system. It is a 
methodology for analyzing the behavior of complex feedback systems over time through 
developing management flight, often computer simulation models to assist decision makers to 
learn about dynamic complexity, understand the consequences of their decisions, and design 
more effective policies (Sterman 2000). According to Sterman, learning depends on feedbacks 
operating in the system. System dynamic emphasis feedback loops rather than one direction 
causality which the Norwegian development cooperation system is operating with today. This 
is because managing development aid is a real world problem and in the real world everything 
influences each other. The time delays are not recognized in today’s approach of managing 
development aid because cause and effect are joined together in time. SD recognizes the time 
delays between cause and effects in the feedback loops. These delays are generated by 
accumulations in the stock variables and it’s the delays that cause instability in the system, 
therefore cause and effect are separated in time and space with SD approach. One of the 
advantages of SD approach is that the findings can be validated by continuous testing of the 
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model either using the quantitative data from the real world or other unrealistic figures to test 
the robustness of the model. 
In the Norwegian development cooperation system, feedbacks are supposed to be attained by 
evaluating projects and programs funded by Norway. The evaluations are supposed to be 
conducted by external experts and these evaluation reports should be published and the results 
communicated to the decision makers. According to the evaluation study, the intentions of the 
evaluation reports are to monitor whether development aid produces results as intended, and 
report the results to the decision makers in order to improve future aid policies through 
feedback of lessons learned. The intention of evaluation is to promote learning in the 
development aid administration. However, according to the evaluation study there is little 
knowledge and research about the degree to which these evaluations are actually used, when 
and how they are used, and which factors influence their use (Rand Europe AS 2013).  
Norad is required by the Evaluation Department to prepare a follow-up plan within six weeks 
of receiving the recommendations from the Evaluation Department to account for how they 
intend to follow them up, and by which timelines. Within a year, the responsible section /unit 
must report on progress made on these actions. According to the Evaluation Department’s 
own records for the period since 2006, not all the evaluations produced by the Evaluation 
Department have the required follow-up plans and/or progress reports (Rand Europe AS 
2013). 
Evaluation without following the feedbacks in the evaluation reports is useless because it does 
not promote learning. This means that the decision makers can’t learn more about the 
complexity of poverty reduction, the consequences of their decisions and therefore difficult to 
make effective policies. 
The development aid allocated to Zambia for reducing poverty depends on the requests from 
the recipients either it’s the government or other organization in cooperation with Norway. 
According to the Norwegian ambassador in Zambia Arve Ofstad, aid is allocated either to the 
Zambian government or other organizations in terms of budget support or through programs 
depending on Zambia’s development plan. According to my experience working in an aid 
agency, development aid from NGOs allocated to programs or projects that are aimed at 
promoting the development of for example the education sector, depend on the request from 
the ministry of education. The ministry sends an application together with a budget of the 
program or project to the donor organization. The donor evaluates the relevance of the 
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program/project and if approved, they transfer the aid funds to the recipient. This means that 
aid allocated to the economic, education and health sector is upon the budget per sector. 
According to the overview of Norwegian evaluations on Norad’s webpage, no evaluation has 
been done for the economic, education and health sectors. However, the education sector is 
scheduled to be evaluated towards the end of the year 2013, with in 11
th
 December. As per 
today, the feedbacks about the effects of aid for the three sectors are not gathered yet, and 
therefore the consequences of their decisions are not known. In turn, the policies cannot be 
improved. 
The ministry of foreign affairs has been criticized by the Norwegian auditor office for lacking 
supervision and control of aid funds to ensure that they are used as intended as mentioned 
earlier. The recipient government can ignore clarifying the use of aid funds without having 
any consequences from Norwegian aid agencies. Norway has fail to make written flow-up 
reports despite the fact that the national auditor office has pointed out significant errors and 
omissions (Riksrevisjonen 2012). It is difficult to promote learning when one does not know 
whether the policies are working or not. 
The purpose of the thesis is to demonstrate how feedbacks from Zambia can change the 
decisions made in Norway. The outcomes from the three sectors in Zambia will influence the 
Zambian development plan which the decision makers in Norway base their decisions. This 
will be discussed in details in section 4. 
System dynamics (SD) is suitable for managing development aid because designing and 
implementing effective policy requires understanding of the complexity of development aid, 
the cause and effects of the policies made to reduce poverty in the developing countries. SD is 
a useful tool for decision makers. The method can assist decision makers in understanding the 
complexity of the feedbacks in the system and to study the consequences over time. Aid is a 
scarce resource and it is important to ensure that it goes where it is needed most. Norad does 
not apply SD today, they follow the Paris declaration discussed in selection 1.3 whereby aid is 
transferred based on the development plan of the Zambian government and not based on the 
effectiveness of the policies. A concrete example that shows that the Norwegian development 
cooperation allocating the aid fund based the recipient was enlightened during the analysis of 
the quantitative data received from Norad, which was used for the development of reference 
modes. An email was sent requesting for an explanation to why development aid allocated to 
the three sectors fluctuated so much over the last 20 years. The intention was to understand 
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their decisions rules. The reply was “We have not done concrete analysis of the aid to 
Zambia. We can therefore not say why there have been changes in the different sectors.  One 
reason for fluctuations between sectors could however be that Norway has given 
unearmarked budget support to Zambia in the period 2007-2011”. (Sindre Wennesland, 
Adviser statistics unit, Department of quality Assurance). No analysis available even though it 
is stated in Norad’s strategy report that one of their operational activities is to continue 
compiling high-quality statistics, and prepare their own analysis of data on use of 
development aid statistics (Norad 2011) 
It’s clear that the complexity of development aid is not understood and this leads to 
unintended effects like corruption discussed in detail in section 2.4.1. Complexity in the 
system arises from the interactions among different elements of the system. The Causal Loop 
Diagram (CLD) in section 2.2.1 shows the linkage between the sectors and the feedback loops 
which reflect both anticipated and unanticipated side effects of the decision maker`s actions. 
Unintended effects arises because there are other actors, with their own goals offset the 
intended effects of the policies.  
2.2.1 Causal Loop Diagrams (CLDs) 
CLDs represent the linkages among key performance indicators with arrows from cause to 
effect of the different sectors; economic, education and health sectors mentioned in figure 2.1, 
a detailed view of the Balanced Scorecard (BSc). The link polarities (+. -) describes what 
would happen if there were a change of variables, (+) indicating an increase while (-) denote a 
decrease in the variables. Determining whether the loop is positive or negative, one has to 
trace the effect of a change in one of the variables and examine how this effect affects the 
other variables round the loop. The polarity of the loop describes the structure of the system. 
If the feedback effect reinforces the original change, then the loop is positive (+) or 
reinforcing behavior. If the effect opposes the originate change then the polarity of the loop is 
negative (-) or a balancing behavior.  To simplify the model, education facilities will be 
represented by schools and health facilities will be represented by clinics. 
CLD is a useful tool for showing the feedback structure of the system, a way of externalizing 
mental models and assumptions. CLD forces managers to  explore the beliefs and 
assumptions which drive their strategy (Sterman 2000). It also links the financial and non-
financial aspects of the structure together as explained below. The linkages show that the 
decision maker cannot improve one sector without affecting the others. The decision is how 
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should development aid be distributed effectively among the different sectors in order to 
reduce poverty?  
This CLD will be translated in a system dynamics software simulation tool called Vensim 
PLE for all the simulations done in section 4. 
 
Figure 2.2.1: Causal loop diagram (CLD) 
The economic sector is represented by color blue in the diagram. It represented by economic 
growth in the diagram. It is influenced by development aid for all the three sectors and tax 
revenues from domestic earnings. The economic sector influences the health and education 
sector and vise-versa. The first loop in color blue is the economic sector. It is a positive loop; 
increased economic growth lead to creation of more jobs and more jobs leads to more 
workers. This in turn increases the tax revenues which lead to more economic growth which 
leads to the reduction of poverty. 
The second loop represents the education sector denoted by red arrows. An increased 
economic growth will lead to an increase in education budget expenditure and this will lead to 
an increase in the building of more schools. In turn, this will lead to an increase in the number 
Economic growth
Building of schools
Tax revenue
Building of clinics
+
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Healthy people+
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+
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+
Health budget
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of graduated students. Graduated students contribute positively to the work force. An 
increased work force leads to and increased amount of tax revenue collected by the 
government. This causal loop is positive, reinforcing economic development in Zambia. 
The third loop with green arrows depicts the health sector is also positive. Economic growth 
increases the health budget expenditures which lead to building of more clinics. More clinics 
means that more people are being treated which lead to more healthy people. A healthy 
population is generally more productive and employable (UNDP 2011). Healthy people 
increase the work force which again leads to increased tax revenue and thus economic growth.  
Work force connects all the three sectors; the education sector is responsible for educating the 
work force, the health sector keeps the work force healthy and the economic sector is 
responsible for increasing the work force by creating more jobs. All the three sectors 
contribute to the economic development which reduces the poverty level. 
Nothing grows forever! The reinforcement that creates economic growth will trigger a limit at 
some point. One day development aid will stops coming and this will limit the economic 
growth described in the CLD if the Zambian government doesn’t invest the tax revenue funds 
wisely to promote sustainable economic growth.  Low economic growth means that the 
government has no resources to invest in job creation, in building of schools and clinics. This 
will lead to the reduction in the work force and thus reducing tax revenue which again leads to 
increased poverty. 
The CLD discussed above shows in details the interconnectedness of the BSc mentioned 
earlier in section 1.2.5. Using causal loop diagram help decision makers get a clear view of 
the dominant feedback loops that dominant in determining the overall behavior of the system 
and what is causing the different effects. The causal loop diagram will be used to construct a 
system dynamic model of the three sectors (economic, education and health) focused on in the 
thesis. Even though system dynamic is a useful tool for decision makers, it is not without any 
criticisms. Some of those are discussed in the section below. 
2.2.2 Limitations with System dynamics approach 
System dynamic is based on modeling to understand the behavior of complex problems. 
Modeling is time-consuming iteration of tests, observations, and hypotheses. Another element 
that contribute to the time-consuming procedures of modeling is that  most of the software  
used in system dynamics have no technical support for helping users understand the 
connections between model structure and behavior (Richardson 2013). Understanding the 
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connections between complex model structure and behavior comes from a sequential 
modeling process that moves from simpler model to more complex structure and continuous 
testing of the model at each stage. The simpler stage guides the path to the understandings of 
the complex structure. Attempting to build a complex model at the outset is likely to fail.  
Another critique is that formal complex models are designed, formulated and presented in 
way which are not understood by the widest possible audience, but a tiny minority of 
modeling experts. It is therefore unsure whether the use of causal loop diagrams showing the 
relationship between stocks and flows is reliable (Richardson 2013).  
Richardson argues further that there are no appropriate procedures and standards for 
establishing user confidence in system dynamics models in various decision environments. 
Model validation and user confidence is difficult to achieve. According to Richardson, in 
1980 Forrester and Senge published a classic statement on model validation and the 
development of user confidence. Examining the triple relationships of model structure, model 
behavior, and linkages between structure and behavior, they proposed a suite of seventeen 
separate tests that can be used ensemble to establish user confidence in system dynamics 
models. One standard procedure could not serve as a single and uniform path to model 
validation because models are built to serve different purpose and therefore will meet 
different levels of scrutiny from the users. For example, models built to support testimony in 
court should surely adhere to different confidence and validity standards than those used to 
inform the strategic thinking of a small corporate board of directors. Similarly, models that 
support public infrastructure planning efforts will meet a different level of scrutiny and review 
than will those supporting policy development in a legislative environment 
Richardson suggest that the field needs to achieve greater consensus concerning what types of 
confidence building and validation procedures and tests are more appropriate in what types of 
decision environments. The future of the field of system dynamics rests on our abilities to 
widen its base, the population understanding the significance of feedback and circular 
causality in living systems. 
 
2.3 The development of a Dynamic Balanced Scorecard (DBSc) model  
The thesis focus on four stages of model development according to ithink (High Performance 
Systems Inc 1994);  
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Stage 1: Focusing the effort. It is about defining the purpose of modeling, developing 
reference behavior patterns and developing a system diagram. The first two elements are 
discussed in section 1. The third element a system diagram, is a high-level diagram of key 
sectors within the model and the interconnectedness between them. This is the Balanced 
Scorecard developed in section 2.1.2. Stage 2 mapping, is about identifying the stocks that are 
responsible for generating the behavior of the system. These stocks were identified in section 
2.1.3, the key performance indicators. These will also be used in the third step which is 
modeling. This will be discussed in this section. Stage 4 simulate, which is about testing the 
model and evaluation of different policies will be discussed in section 4. 
The purpose of this section is to develop a DBSc model structure that shows the relationship 
between the economic, education and health sector. A system dynamic model starts with 
identifying the main operation variable of the system. The causal loop diagram developed in 
the section 2.2.1 consists of these operation variables, and these will be translated into a 
quantified simulation model using key data from Norad. The model provides a framework for 
understanding the structure and the dynamic of the development aid sector. The reference 
modes constructed in section 1.2 set the boundary of the model. The model consists of three 
aggregated sectors that display the structure and decision variables in The Norwegian 
development cooperation system. The decision variables are how much development aid 
should be distributed to each sector as shown in the figure; what fraction of aid should be 
allocated to the health sector which is represented by 
clinics, education sector represented by schools and 
economic sector donated by workers. These decision 
variables will address the second research question of 
“How should development aid be allocated among 
sectors? Equal or unequal distribution?” 
 
 The sectors are interrelated to portray the dynamic balanced scorecard model which is a 
combination of BSc and System dynamics. The model uses the stock and flow language of 
system dynamics to represent the key performance indicators mentioned in section 2.1.3 as 
stocks. The flows for each sector will be identified.  Stocks characterize the state of the 
system and generate the information upon which decisions are based. Flows are the rates of 
increase or decrease in the stock.  Adding stock and flow terms to the model is important as it 
frac to
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frac to
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frac to
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total funding
allocation
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allows simulations to be carried out (Sterman 2000). Stock and flow allows the advisory team 
in Norad and decision makers in the Norwegian development cooperation system to use actual 
or approximate measurement data to infer the end effects of their policies. The decision 
makers and advisory team can also use the stock and flow elements to change measurements 
within the system and simulate to study the effects of the changes. In the structure model, the 
sectors will be interconnected using shadow variables. The algebraic relationship between 
different variables will be specified. Parameters which consist of constants, initial values, and 
graphical functions will also be specified (equations and all the documents will be provided in 
the appendix). 
Economic sector 
The economic sector is influenced by funds from development aid and domestic earnings in 
terms of tax revenue. Development aid allocated to the economic sector is intended to 
increase the level of work force in the country. The increase of workers depends on various 
factors: First is the total population and to what rate the population increases each year. 
Population times the working fraction gives the number of workers in the country. It is 
assumed the population group between 15 -50 years of age is considered to be the working 
population. The early retiring age is due to the low life expectancy in the country which 52,57 
(CIA 2013). There is a working population gap when there is difference between the desired 
level of work force and the actual work force. In case the desired level of work force is less 
than the actual work force, this indicates the need for more workers and therefore more focus 
on economic development. If the opposite is true, then there is no need for additional 
economic support for the time being. The variable “desired fraction population working” is 
donated in red to indicate that this is a part of the decision variable mentioned earlier for the 
economic sector.   
The increase of workers is influenced by a number of elements; first is the amount of 
resources allocated to increase employment. This amount is influence by the total financial 
resources and the fraction of development aid allocated to the economic sectors (to workers). 
Another factor is the level of health among the working population, high level of health 
increases the working population. But, people don’t work forever, they leave the work force at 
a certain age depending on the average length of the employment which is assumed to be 30 
years. Work force can therefore increase when the number of people entering the work force 
is greater than those who are retiring. 
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Apart from development aid allocated to the economic sector, the financial resources of the 
country are also influenced by the domestic earnings (tax revenue) which come from annual 
average salary of the workers times the average tax rate. The average salary is influenced by 
the level of education. The total financial resource stock is therefore development aid 
(allocated to the education, health and economic sector) plus domestic earnings. 
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The financial resources are used to meet the needs per sector depending on the need backlog 
per sector. Need backlog is the sum total of all indicated social needs per sector measured in 
monetary units. This is to facilitate comparison with available financial resources, regardless 
of application and to enable decision makers to investigate the consequences of their 
priorities. The need backlog is increased by the following elements: the need for new workers  
times the cost per new worker, the need for new clinics times the cost per clinic, and need of 
new schools times cost per school. The needs are met by building the schools and clinics, and 
by allocating resources to improve the employment situation. All these needs are expenditures 
that reduce the financial resources. The total financial resources are reduced when the 
expenditures are greater than the incoming resources. The indicated need for building more 
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schools and clinics will increase as the population increases. It is assumed that it will cost 1.2 
million to build a school or a clinic. Building of a primary and secondary school will take four 
year to complete. The cost includes the construction, desks, chalkboards, textbooks, clean 
drinking water, sanitation, ventilation and electricity. The clinic will take three years to build 
and cost includes construction, emergency medical supplies and all medical equipments. 
The model shows how the economic sector influences both the education and health sector. 
The linkages to the economic sector from both education and health sector are represented by 
the shadow variable in grey color with parenthesis. Population also influences all the three 
sectors as discussed in the following sections. 
Education sector 
This model has three stocks; schools, students and education level. All these stocks are 
interconnected with each other. The schools stock is increased when the number of schools 
built is greater than the decaying schools. Building of school is influenced by a number of 
factors; the financial resources allocated for building schools, the cost per school and the time 
it takes to build the school. The availability of adequate schools is assumed to be one school 
for every 10 000 people in the general population. The availability of schools increases the 
fraction of the population that is expected to attend schools. This fraction increases the 
number of students. This again increases the number of students that graduates. However, not 
all the students manage to graduate, some drop out of the school due to different reasons 
among others; poor quality of education, economic constraints and long distances to school. 
The student stock is increased when the number of students starting school is bigger than the 
number of students graduating or dropouts. The average number of students per school 
depends on the initial number of schools and the initial number of students. The desired 
number of students per school is 1000. In case the average number of students per school is 
more than the desired students per school, there is a need for building more schools. The 
variable “desired student per school” is part of decision variable for the education sector. The 
financial resources and the cost of building a school are shadow variables that connect the 
economic sector to the education sector. Population as with the economic sector also 
influences the education sector in terms of the fraction of the school age population that is 
expected to attend schools. 
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The level of education stock is influenced by the number of graduated students and the 
knowledge unit per graduate which is assumed to 1 percent. The level of education is 
decreased when the number of students that drop out of school are more those that graduates. 
Health sector 
The health sector has also three stocks; Clinics, sick people and level of health. The clinics 
stock is increased when clinics built are greater than those clinics that are being destroyed. 
Building of these clinics depends on; resources allocated to the health sector, cost per clinic 
and the time it takes to build each clinic. The retiring rate of the clinics depends on the 
number of clinics divided by the average life time of the clinics. The average patients per 
clinic are determined by the number of sick people divided by the clinics. The desired number 
of patients per clinic is 1 000. If the average number of patients per clinic is more than the 
desired patients per clinic, there is a need for building new clinics. 
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The availability of the clinics and the average productivity of the clinics determine the 
number of sick people getting treatment and therefore becoming well. The number of sick 
people depends on the general health level the population has and the fraction of the 
population that become sick. The sick people stock is increased when the number of sick 
people is greater than the number of people being cured.   
The general health level of the public is influenced by the number of people getting cured and 
those that get sick. It is assumed that every 1000 people cured increases the general health 
level of the population and every 100000 sick people reduces the level of health.  
 
 
The health sector is linked to the education sector through the work force in the sense that the 
health level of the population influences the fraction of the population entering the work 
force. This sector is linked to the economic sector through finances allocated to this sector and 
this is indicated by the shadow variables. 
The models show a holistic picture of all interconnections and relationships that exist in the 
system and this will enable Norad’s advisory team to visualize and understand these 
interrelations clearly. The structure could lead to both the intended effects and the unintended 
effects of development aid. The next section discusses the theory behind the Paris declaration 
followed by the Norwegian aid agencies which leads to the unintended effects of development 
aid. 
2.4 Theory behind the Paris declaration 
Over the past years different mechanisms for improving the quality of aid have been 
developed. One of these mechanisms is the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness 
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which is focusing on country ownership, donor harmonization, alignment to recipient 
countries’ national development strategies, managing for results and mutual accountability 
between donors and aid receiving countries in order to reduce poverty as mentioned earlier in 
section 1.3. 
Richard Manning, a former chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee and the 
principal architect of the Paris Declaration, wondered how the Paris Declaration will affect 
behavior on the ground in developing countries (Eyben 2008). The declaration is about 
forming relationships between donors and recipients. Eyben suggests that it is a way of 
framing organizational relationships that is derived from rational choice theory in Economics. 
Putting principal-agent theory into practice requires institutionalized positive and negative 
incentives to align actors’ interests with the interests of those who have set the agenda but do 
not have the power to implement it. Changing behavior through incentive structures has 
become so ‘naturalized’ in modern management as one of the theories that seek to explain 
human behavior.  
According to the 2008 progress report on implementing the Paris Declaration, the behavior 
patterns for some of the donors and recipients have not changed. Inefficient patterns of 
managing development aid persist and there are few signs of change. This explains the 
continuous existence of corruption and dependency on aid in many aid recipient countries. 
The establishment of Paris declaration principles is a step towards effective management of 
aid, but more need to be done to reduce the negative effects of development aid spread around 
many African countries. Some of these unintended effects are discussed below. 
2.4.1 Unintended effects of aid 
Corruption is one of the main problems of development aid. It is a well-known issue among 
many African countries. As development aid pours in the country, the officials, politicians 
and government workers shift their efforts away from skills and knowledge that will benefit 
the economic and social sectors, towards skills that will optimize their share of aid (Knack & 
Azfar 2000) in order to pursue their personal objectives. This is the shifting of the burden 
discussed in section 1.2.5. The government officials shift their efforts from developing their 
country to focusing on person gains, leaving the burden of fighting poverty to the aid 
agencies. 
Another issue with corruption is that aid intended for the social and economic sectors in order 
to generate improvements in welfare may simply free the funds that governments would have 
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spent on these sectors. The freed funds can be used to fund other activities not intended by the 
donor like military or used on personal favors or other activities that will help the government 
to stay in power. Again shifting the burden as discussed above. 
According to the Aftenposten accessed on the 31.01.13, money intended for development of 
the country is illegally transferred out of the country in many developing countries. Illegal 
money transfers from the developing countries increased by 11 percent in 2010. A staggering 
4700 billion kroners disappear every year. Money disappears through tax evasion, mispricing 
and corruption. Large sums are hidden in international tax paradises. 
Many African countries experience the greatest impact of this problem. Even though Norway 
is supporting good financial management in Zambia, such as building capacity in the Zambia 
Revenue Authority to enable the government correct taxes, Zambia has been drained for 
decades of funds equivalent to twice the country's annual income. According to the 
development minister Holmaas, the mining companies in Zambia are often seen as avoiding 
taxes through transfer pricing and lack of transparency in terms of volumes produced and 
exported, prices and costs. Only one or two companies in Zambia declare profits and pay 
corporate profit tax (The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Lusaka 2013). Overall, developing 
countries lose ten times as much illegal money outflows, as these countries receive in 
development aid. Zambia’s international mining companies have been investigated for hiding 
large amount of money to avoid paying taxes to the government. 
Aid funds also disappear in the illegal capital flight, even if money flows are better monitored. 
Donor countries should be worried! (Aftenposten 2013). 
Political leadership and the elite are central in hiding tax money into tax paradises. It may be 
that the political elite can have their own interests to maintain a regime that does not serve the 
general population in order to continue receiving aid. This has resulted in dependency as it 
induces a lazy and dependent mentality of the governments and civil societies. This 
undermines the peoples’ faith that they can improve development on their own. This reduces 
the incentives to invest, especially when the recipient is assured that future poverty will call 
for more aid. It seem like most African countries are so dependent on aid that without it 
almost half of their yearly budgetary commitments cannot be fulfilled (Andrews 2009). 
Corruption and dependency hinders the implementation of fundamental policies which 
promote economic growth and this keeps the country in poverty. Combining the Paris 
declaration with a dynamic balanced scorecard will be a useful tool in fighting corruption and 
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thus reduce dependence on development aid. This is because when development aid is 
managed effectively there is less room for corruption. 
In addition to the unintended effects, there are other limitations of the Paris declaration and 
some of them are discussed in the section below. 
2.4.2 Limitation of the Paris declaration 
According to OECD report 2012, efforts have focused more on aid effectiveness processes 
than on the impact of better aid. The transaction costs of aid effectiveness processes are high, 
in particular for donor country staff, and there is a risk that the costs are disproportionate to 
the benefits. In addition, demonstrating and attributing the impact of aid effectiveness is 
challenging and there is no common understanding of what results can realistically be 
expected or how these will be measured. Greater efforts are required to improve wider 
understanding of aid effectiveness principles by the government officials and the civil society. 
Another concern is related to the fact that management for results is often misinterpreted as 
management by results. This generally leads to changes in allocation patterns towards quick 
wins, easily measurable results, and short-term deliverables to the disadvantage of investment 
in long-term changes (Koster & Holvoet 2012). There is a need to agree on realistic results 
and how they should be measured in order to promote aid effectiveness and realistic 
timeframes for achieving change. The time aspect for change should be realistic because it 
takes time to change behaviors and processes.  
Both donor and receipts are committed to the Paris declaration but, the principles are not put 
into practice as intended. This fact is also supported by the case-study carried out by Koster, 
findings show that, in spite of bilateral agencies’ discussion and commitment to more 
harmonized and aligned approaches in the area of measuring and assessing Paris declarations’ 
effectiveness, the current level of harmonization and alignment on the ground is relatively 
low. Evidence from Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK hints at the fact that this may to 
some extent be related to the diverging performance management cultures in which the 
bilateral donor agencies are embedded (Koster & Holvoet 2012). There is an urgent need to 
scale up implementation by a wider range of donors and recipient countries, and to identify 
incentives to make this happen. Greater effort is required to strengthen and use country 
systems that meet accepted standards, to actively reduce project aid and increase the longer-
term predictability of aid and to institutionalize common results framework and mutual 
accountability measure. 
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There are conflicting views about whether global programs strengthen or undermine country 
ownership. The slow pace of harmonization and alignment of global programs at country 
level and heavily earnmarked funding potentially hinder country ownership (OECD 2012).  
The next section discusses the research methods used to find the relevant information and data 
collection methods. 
3. Method  
In this selection, the choice of research method, data collection methods and data analysis 
methods are discussed. The research method is discussed first. 
3.1 Research method 
There are two types of research methods that could be used; qualitative and quantitative 
methods which are defined according to the methods used to collect data and the purpose of 
the research (Askheim & Grenness 2008). Quantitative method seeks to explain something 
and the data collection is normally done through surveys using structured questionnaire forms. 
Data collection using qualitative method is normally done through group interviews, 
observations or personal depth interviews, and from multiple data sources. Qualitative method 
was chosen because it will provide  a better understand of how development aid is managed 
today by The Norwegian development cooperation system and how Norad evaluate the 
policies of the activities funded by development aid. And further, how Norad’s advises impact 
the decision making in The Norwegian development cooperation system. Qualitative method 
is the most appropriate method for my research question because;   
 The intention is to  understand how the Norwegian development cooperation system 
make their decisions which leads to the observed effects of development aid 
 How Norad evaluate the decision policies and what impact has these evaluations on 
decision making  
 Focus on one case study (Norad) which is a representative for a large population of  
development aid agencies 
 Collect data from multiple sources and analysis the data material parallel with data 
collection. 
3.2 Data gathering approaches 
Data collection and data analysis frequently overlap in the case study research. Data 
collection and analysis of data was conducted parallel.  This joint work was very helpful 
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during the construction of reference modes whereby references modes were constructed and 
analyzed at the same. Case study research generates a large amount of data from multiple 
sources. This provided an opportunity to triangulate the data in order to strengthen the 
findings of the case study. The data was collected from the follow sources; 
i) Articles/books available on development aid in general and effective management 
of aid. The purpose was to search for facts and evidence about development aid. 
ii)  Norad was contacted both by phone and email and the statistical data for 
development aid allocated to Zambia per sector from 1991 to 2011 was provided. 
The data was used to construct reference modes and it will be used in the modeling 
process. Different reports from Norad’s webpage were also used to understand 
Norad’s strategy and the way they make decisions. It was difficult to conduct 
interviews because Norad does not have the capacity to allocate time to that. 
Because of that the questions where sent by email requesting for information about 
how the policies of allocating aid to Zambia is made, how these policies are 
evaluated and which impact they have on decision making, what are the key 
performance measures per sector, and whether there is any coordination within the 
Norwegian development cooperation system. 
iii) Information about Zambia`s development trend was attained from rapports 
gathered from various websites. 
iv) Followed the media to capture the perspectives the public has about the effect of 
development aid. 
The knowledge from these sources is discussed throughout the thesis. 
3.3 Data analysis 
Data analysis is divided into two stages. 
First stage; the first analysis was done in section one. The qualitative data needed for 
development aid transferred from Norway to Zambia per sector was analyzed and reference 
modes were developed. Reference modes showed the relationships between development aid 
and the effects to; the economic, education and health sectors in Zambia as explained in 
sections 1.2.1 to 1.2.4. The conclusion from this analysis was that development aid does not 
achieve the intended effects. 
Second stage: the second analysis is the model analysis in section 4. The analysis will be done 
using simulation modeling. Simulation modeling will assist in addressing research questions 
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ii) and iii) by evaluating the policies of whether to allocate equal or unequal aid among the 
three sectors. Different scenario runs will be developed to examine possible futures policies 
and to identify the policies that seem effective for reducing poverty.  
3.4 Limitations of organizing the research as a case study 
Critics of the case study method believe that the study of one case cannot offer grounds for 
establishing reliability or generality of the findings (Askheim & Grenness 2008). Reliability is 
easily achieved with quantitative research method because the method is objective and more 
structured in form of surveys which makes it easier for other researcher to evaluate the 
reliability of the results. When it comes to qualitative method however, the researcher is 
subjective and not as structured as with the quantitative method which makes it challenging 
for other researchers to evaluate the reliability of the results. It is normally the researchers 
themselves who consider the reliability of qualitative results through continuous feedbacks 
between the researcher and the respondents. Due to the fact that it is not easy to replicate the 
results from qualitative research method, it is considered one of the weaknesses of this 
method.  
Concerning generalizing of the findings however, I believe that the findings from the case 
study in this thesis is generalizable because Norad is a typical aid agency and can therefore 
represent other aid agencies. Zambia is also a typical developing country receiving 
development aid. Therefore, Norad as a case study and Zambia as an example of a country 
have no impact on the findings, it could have been another aid agency and another country.  
This means the tools used to produce the results can be applied to any other aid agency and to 
any country receiving development aid.  
Data collection using qualitative method is normally done through interviews and from 
multiple data sources as mentioned earlier. The intention was to conducted open-ended 
interviews with key decision makers responsible for development aid allocated to Zambia and 
the advisory team in the Norad. The purpose of the interview was to understand the policies 
used today, the reasoning back those policies, whether decision makers fully understand the 
consequences of their decisions, finding the key performance indicators for the economic, 
education and health sector and how the decision makers coordinate with each other. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to conduct these interviews due to time constraints and 
other hindrances among potential respondents. The alternative was to communicate via 
telephone and emails. It wasn’t quit the same because all the information needed was not 
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provided, a number of questions remained unanswered.  In the absence of being able to 
conduct interviews with policy makers some assumptions were made based on my own 
experience working in an aid organization and also based on the way decision makers avoided 
answering some vital questions. For example the Norwegian ambassador in Zambia was 
asked to explain how the four entities in the Norwegian development cooperation (Norad, 
MFA, Norfund and the embassy) collaborated with each other in the fight against reducing 
poverty. The response was “I am sorry, but it is really not my job to make the assessments 
that you ask for. I suggest you revert to spokespersons for the various institutions to make 
interviews with them. Good luck on your work”. I assumed there are no collaborations that’s 
why he didn’t know the answer! Other decision makers were contacted, but they were all 
bouncing me around from one decision maker to another without getting any answer. It was 
therefore concluded that there was no collaboration among the entities since nobody could 
give answer. 
The next and final stage in modeling is simulation. The structure model developed in section 
2.3 is going to be simulated and the results will be discussed in the next section.  
4. DBSc model analysis and demonstration of development aid policies 
In this selection, the structure models of the three sectors built in section 2.3 will be used to 
demonstrate the use of a DBSc model. The policies will be tested through experimental 
modeling. The testing begins with formulating the equations to specify the algebraic 
relationship between stocks and flows.  When the equations are already, the model will be 
simulated to study the dynamic behavior of development aid allocation. The model will be 
tested under extreme conditions that may never happen in the real world. This is critical to 
discover the flaws in the model and better the understanding of the model. After testing the 
model, it will be used to evaluate the policy alternatives mentioned in section 1.5 of how 
much aid should be allocated to each sector and to find the most effective policy of reducing 
poverty. The interaction of different policies will also be assessed to identify policies that 
reinforce one another and generate a substantial synergy effect. The high leverage policies 
will be recommended and this will lead to changing the structure system of the Norwegian 
development cooperation through Zambian development plan. 
The time horizon for modeling is from 1960 – 2050. Time horizon from 1960 was chosen 
because the Norwegian agencies started giving development aid in the 60s but Norad, did not 
have the data from that period. The data that is available is from 1991 to 2011. The average 
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development aid provided for the last decade (2001-2011) will be used in the model. The year 
2050 was chosen to be the end of the simulation period because the intention was to extend 
the time horizon far longer enough into the future to capture the delayed and indirect effects 
of the policies, and to infer the future development. 
The behavior of the system is generated from its feedback structure. There are six common 
fundamental modes of dynamic behaviors which are expected to be observed during the 
simulations; 
 Exponential growth which arises from a positive or self-reinforcing feedback loop.  
 Goal seeking which is derived from a negative feedback loop, act to bring the system 
in line with the desired goal. Both of these behaviors were observed and discussed 
under the causal loop diagram in section 2.2.1. 
 Oscillation is caused by negative feedback with time delays whereby the system is 
constantly overshoot its goals from the presence of time delays. The delays cause 
corrective actions to continue even after the system reaches it goals, triggering a new 
correction in the opposite direction.   
The first three dynamic behaviors are created from the feedback of the system. The next three 
are created from the nonlinear interaction of the basic structures above. 
 S-shaped growth is exponential growth at first, but then gradually slows down until 
the system reaches its goal. This behavior is a combination of exponential growth and 
goal seeking. 
 Growth with overshoot is similar to the S-shaped growth, but with time delays so that 
the system overshoots producing an Oscillation behavior. 
 Overshoot and Collapse is when the system grows exponentially until it reaches its 
equilibrium and then collapses because the carrying capacity is consumed. 
Some of these behaviors will be discussed in details according to what behaviors that are 
portrayed during the simulation runs.  
4.1 Simulation runs 
This selection presents the fourth stage of a dynamic BSc modeling discussed in section 2.3. 
Simulation assists in building confidence in the model through iteration of tests and 
experimenting with different policies before they are implemented. It is recommended to start 
simple, one sector at a time and then gradually run a combination of sectors. The thesis 
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presents computer simulation models for each sector showing the impact of the different 
policies aimed at reducing poverty. Vensum PLE simulation modeling tool is used for all the 
runs. A system dynamic model developed in section 2.3 is used for all the runs. The model 
was tested first by putting some of the sectors into the equilibrium state using arbitrary figures 
in order to ensure that the model behaved appropriately.  
Next, the equilibrium was disturbed by changing the arbitrary figures with real life figures to 
replicate the population reference behavior modes in section 1. Not all the references could be 
replicated because not all the real data need was available. The intention of replicating the 
population mode was to ensure the robustness of the model. The run shows the population 
development in Zambia from 1960 to 2050. The initial population was estimated to be 3.3 
million people in 1960, growing at a rate of 4.4 percent. The Zambia population has been 
increasing since independence in 1964 as discussed earlier in section 1. According to the 
1980, 1990 and 2000 censuses the population of Zambia was estimated at 5.7, 7.8 and 9.9 
million respectively. These figures are attained in the run below. According to UNESCO, the 
annual average population growth rate has declined from 4.4 in 1960 to 3.1 between 1969 -
1980, and further from 2.7 percent between 1980 -1990 to 2.4 percent between 1990 -2000 
(UNESCO 2008). As the run shows, the population will continue to rise. It is estimated to be 
around 17 million people in the year 2050. Population is an endogenous factor in the 
simulation model that influences all the three sectors.  
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After testing the model, it’s time to evaluate the policies. First to be evaluated is how the 
system will react when no resources is allocated to any sector, followed by  today’s policies 
implemented by the Norwegian agencies, and  lastly evaluating different policies of whether 
to allocate equal or unequal shares of aid funds among different sectors. The evaluation will 
lead to the identification of policies that seems to be more effective. The benefit of a balanced 
scorecard with simulation is that experiments can be carried out before allocating aid to the 
economic, education and health sectors in Zambia. Assumptions can be tested through 
experimentation and the existing decision rules can be modified. Simulation modeling is a 
learning laboratory were both the decision makers and advisers can learn through working 
together. 
The decision variables are constructed in such way that the policy makers can change the 
values of the variables to observe the consequences of each policy. Four runs will be carried 
out per sector; the basis run, the run for today’s policies, equal distribution run and unequal 
distribution. Some estimates that are made in the model will be explained along the way. 
4.2 Baseline scenario, no distribution of financial resources 
The baseline run is the first scenario which shows how the systems reacts with no financial 
resources allocated to the economic, education and health.  
4.2.1 Economic sector, 0 percent 
The financial resources for this sector are intended to promote economic growth through 
creation of employment indicated by the number of new workers entering the work force. To 
demonstrate this, some estimates are made; the work force influences the domestic earnings 
of the country though paying taxes from the worker’s average annual salaries. It is assumed 
that the baseline average annual salary per worker is NOK 50 000 per year. And because the 
salary is low, the average tax is estimated to be 15 percent. It is estimated further that the 
population in 1960 was 3.3million and that 25 percent of the population between the ages of 
15-50 are considered to be a working population. 20 million NOK is assumed to be the initial 
financial value. Apart from the population, the work force is also influenced by the amount of 
resources allocated to increase the employment rate. This depends on the gap between the 
actual number of workers and the desired number. In case the average number of workers is 
lower than required, then there is a need for financial resources to increase the number of 
people entering the work force.  
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 It is assumed that it will require NOK 100 000 per one percent increase in the fraction of 
entering workforce. In addition, there are other costs involved in creating new jobs which are 
not specified. 
There is no financial resources allocated and this means that they will not be any increase in 
the work force. It is assumed that 25 percent of the population between the ages 15-50 is in 
the working population, but with no financial resources to increase the employment rate it is 
not certain how many of the working population will be actually working throughout the 
simulation period. The runs in this section will demonstrate how the fraction of actual workers 
will react to no funding.   
The first run shows that the fraction of workers is less than 25 percent of the population and 
the gap gets wider and wider. This is because there are no financial resources to increase the 
employment rate. 
 
The next run shows a clear development of the number of workers per year without any 
financial resources. The initial number of worker in 1960 was 825 000, this number started to 
decrease from 1961 up to 1978 with the lowest number of worker of 79 669. This decrease 
indicated a need for financial resources to increase employment. However, because the 
population was increasing, the number of workers also started to slightly increase 
exponentially from 1979. According to the run, they will only be 2 026 977 workers out of the 
estimated 17 million people.  
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To get a clear view of the development of actual fraction of the working population and the 
number of workers entering the work force, the graphs for these two variables are developed 
separately below. The graph for the actual fraction of the working population is discussed 
first. 
 
The graph shows that with no financial resources, the fraction of the actual working 
population decreases. The initial fraction was 25 percent in 1960 and this fraction lasted until 
1963, but then it started dropping at a low rate. From the year 2000-2025 the actual fraction of 
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workers is approximately 11.5 percent. Because of population growth, the fraction will start 
increasing at a low rate from 2026. By 2050 the fraction of actual worker will be 12.2 percent. 
The fraction of actual is so low compared to the desired fraction of 25 percent. The average 
fraction of worker throughout the simulation period is estimated to be 13.74 percent. This 
means that 11.26 percent of the working population is without jobs. This will affect the 
domestic earning negatively and it will slow down the economic growth in the country. 
Because there are no financial resources, the number of people entering the work force is also 
low. As the graph below shows, the initial number of people entering the work force was 
17 983 in 1960 and this number increases at a low rate due to population growth. By 2050 
they will be 90 284 people entering the work force. This means that 0.53 percent will be 
entering the work force in 2050. This is relatively low compared to the population of 17 
million estimated in 2050. 
 
The next graph is about the financial resources stock. This stock consists of development aid 
and tax revenue from domestic earnings. There are no resources allocated to neither the 
education nor health sector either. This means that there are no expenses in this run. As shown 
in the run, the expenditures are equal to zero because no schools and clinics are being build, 
and no increase in the employment rate. The financial resources show exponential growth 
because of the domestic earnings coming in and there are no expenses. The financial 
resources will decrease when the expenses are more than the incoming domestic earning and 
the development aid. 
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Not investing in building of schools and clinics will affect the work force negatively; it will 
contribute to the increase of uneducated work force which means low average salary and thus 
low tax revenues for the government. In turn, this will slow down the economic growth. The 
domestic earnings will also be affected when the health level of the general population is low. 
Fewer people will be able to work because they are not being treated. Reducing the domestic 
earnings and therefore slowing down the economic growth.  
4.2.2 Heath sector, 0 percent 
The initial number of clinics was 66 in 1960. This was achieved by assuming that 20 percent 
of the population 660 000 (3300 000*0.2) needs medical attention and the number of desired 
patients per clinic is 10 000. No finances resources allocated to this sector mean that no more 
clinics will be built. This means that the number of clinics will be decreasing from its initial 
value of 66 to zero clinics by the year 2002. This is because the deteriorating rate is greater 
than the building rate, an exponential decay behavior. As an effect of that, the level of health 
of the general population will also decrease from the initial value of 30 to below 20. 
Reduction in the number of clinics results in an increase in the number of sick people because 
they are not getting treated. The run shows that the number of sick people increases 
exponentially. This will have a negative impact on the work force as many people will not be 
able to work. This will affect the domestic earning because fewer people working result in 
less tax revenue to the government and thus slowing the economic growth.  
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4.2.3 Education sector, 0 percent 
In Zambia the school age for primary and secondary school is in the 7-18 year range, it takes 
12 years to graduate. It is assumed that the school age population constitutes 30 percent of the 
population, but only half of them attend school initially. The initial population in 1960 is 
estimated to be 3.3 million and this gives initial number of students to be 495000. This 
number of students requires 495 schools to get the required 1000 students per school. 
Because there are no financial resources provided to build more schools, the number of 
available schools reduces exponentially because the deteriorating rate is greater than the 
building rate. The number of students starting school shows an oscillation behavior, they are 
increasing in the beginning even though the number of schools is decreasing. This is because 
there is a delay in realizing that there are no enough schools to accommodate all. The number 
of students starts to fall until middle 90s in responding to lack of schools. But due to the 
increasing population, the number of students starts to increase again, even though the number 
of schools is diminishing. This leads to more students per school than what is required. A 
classroom will therefore accommodate more than 40 pupils per teacher, thereby reducing 
pupil-teacher contact. This will lead to a low completion rate discussed earlier of 2.1. Fewer 
students will be graduating and therefore many dropouts. This will affect the tax revenue 
negatively because the majority of the population will be uneducated. The annual average 
salary for the low educated work force is lower than the estimated average annual salary and 
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this reduces the tax revenues which again lead to low economic growth. This will also lead to 
a reduction in the general education level of the country.  
 
4.2.4 Summary of the baseline run 
Input, decision variables Output 
Economic sector, 0% 
 
Because there is no financial resources to increase the 
employment rate, the number of workers is low, an avereage 
of 13.74 percent. This is low compared to the desired rate of 
25 percent. Unemployment reduces domestic earning and 
therefore slowing down the economic growth.  
Health sector, 0% 
 
No funds  allocated means that no clinics are build and 
therefore those which exists deteriorates eventually leading 
to no clinics that provide treatment to the general population. 
This leads to the increase in the number of sick people which 
effects the work force and the national income negatively.  
Education sector 0% No money means no building of schools and thus fewers 
students that graduate. This leads to an increase in the 
number of uneducated work force with low average salary. 
This results in low tax revenues and thus low economic 
development. 
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The intention of baseline runs was to test how the models will react to not receiving any 
financial resources. The conclusion is, without financial resources allocate to any of the 
sectors, they will be no economic development in the country and this will lead to more 
poverty.  
The conclusion from the runs is still consistent with system theory of interconnectedness and 
therefore the model can be used for several scenarios. The different types of scenarios that are 
discussed in the following sections are chosen for assessing today’s policies and the policy 
alternatives of whether the Norwegian agencies should allocated equal or unequal shares 
among the economic, education and health sector. This is meant to be a demonstration to how 
policy makers can promote learning through evaluating the consequences of their policies and 
therefore make changes which can improve the effectiveness of development aid towards 
reducing poverty.  The next run evaluates today’s policies used by the Norwegian agencies. 
4.3 Second scenario, today’s policies 
The intention of this run is to evaluate today’s policies using the data from 1991-2011 
provided by Norad’s statistics unit. The evaluation will be done using a simulation model. 
The baseline run indicated a working population gap of 11.26 percent therefore financial 
resources are need to increase the number of people entering the work force in order to reduce 
the gap.  
The total development aid allocated for the three sectors from 1991-2011 is NOK 4 475 237 
million and from this amount 58 percent was distributed to the economic sector, 24 percent to 
the education sector and l8 percent to the health sector. Today the Norwegian agencies are 
practicing uneven distribution of development aid among the three sectors. The average 
development aid and average percent rate for the last 10 year (2001-2011) will be used in the 
simulation model. The average development aid for all the three sectors is NOK 247 497 000. 
Using the average percentage allocation per sector 
between a 10 years period 2001-2011, the 
education sector received the largest share followed 
by the economic sector. The percentages does not 
necessarily sum to 100 percent if the decision is 
made to not use all the resources for each year, 
essentially saving them for the future.  
Average allocation for 10 yrs 
Education
7,07%
Economic
5,41%
Health
3,86%
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The run for the economic sector is developed first followed by the health sector and lastly the 
education sector. 
4.3.1 Economic sector, 5.41 percent 
Norway provides support to the economic sector in terms general budget support directly to 
the government of Zambia and through different Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). 
The main focus for the Norwegian agencies is supporting good financial management in 
Zambia, such as building capacity in the Zambia Revenue Authority to enable them collect 
tax revenues. In order to collect tax revenues this model focuses on increasing the 
employment rate which leads to more workers and thus more tax revenue which in return 
promotes economic growth. In this run, there is a working population gap of 11.26 percent 
carried over from the baseline run and this gap requires financial resources.  
This run shows the effect of allocating 5.41 percent of the financial resources to the economic 
sector. The graph shows an exponential increase in the number of workers. The initial number 
of workers in 1960 was 825 000. This number of workers started to decrease from 1961 until 
1981. This indicated a need for financial resources to increase employment. The funds 
contributed to the increase in the number of workers from 1982 throughout the simulation 
period. By 2050 they will be 2 794 075 compared to 2 026 977 in the baseline run. 
 
The actual fraction of the working population and the number of workers entering the work 
force are shown separately to get a better view of the effect of this policy. 
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As shown in the graph below, the fraction of the working population has increased due to 
allocation of financial resources. The fraction was 25 percent from 1961 until 1963, but then it 
started falling from 1964 until 1994. Because of the availability of financial resources, the 
fraction started to slightly rising again. By 2015 the fraction of actual workers will be 14.6 
percent and by 2050 they will be 16.8 percent. The average fraction of actual workers for this 
policy is 15.8 percent. The gap of 11.26 will be reduced to 9.2 percent. More financial 
resources are needed in order to achieve the target fraction of 25 percent. 
 
Allocation of financial resources resulted in the increase of the number of people entering the 
work force as shown in the graph below. The initial number of entering the work force in the 
1960 was 17 983 and this increased at a low rate until 1983. Because of financial resources 
allocated, there was a higher increase in the number of people entering the work force and the 
numbers continued to increase throughout the simulation period. By 2050, they will be 
125 632 people entering the work force compared to 90 284 in the baseline run. 
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The allocation of 5.41 percent of the financial resources has led to a slight increase in the 
number of workers entering the work force compared to the baseline, but this sector needs 
more financial resources in order to achieve the required number of workers of 25 percent. 
The average percentage of workers has increased from 12.2 to approximately 15.8 percent. 
This reduced the gap from 11.26 to 9.2 percent, a 2.06 increase. More financial resources are 
required to cover this gap. This means that allocating 5.41 is not effective as it does not 
produced the required results. 
4.3.2 Health sector, 3.86 percent 
Millions of people in Zambia battle daily with diseases associated with poverty. The 
Norwegian agencies assist by allocating aid to the health sector through budget support 
directly to the Zambian government and via international organizations for improving health 
facilities, other social infrastructures and services, and water and sanitation. To simplify the 
model these goals are represented by building clinics which are responsible for improving the 
general health level of the population.  
The run shows that the financial resources contribute to the building of many clinics. As a 
result, the number of sick people reduces which result in increasing the number of workers 
which again contributes positively to economic growth. 
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The problem with this policy is that there is more aid provided than what is needed for this 
sector, there are too many clinics. There were enough clinics from 1960 as each clinic served 
the desired number of patient of 10 000. But then the number of clinics continued to increase 
leading to fewer patient per clinic than what is desired. For example, in 1970 there were 1 053 
patients per clinic, 272 in 1990 and 175 patients in the year 2000. The number of patients per 
clinic continued to decrease as the number of clinics increased. It is clear that this policy is 
not effective. The allocation to this sector has to be reduced to avoid unnecessary building of 
more clinics. 
In Zambia the number sick people per clinic depend on where the clinic is allocated. The 
clinics in the urban area are intended to serve 30 000-50 000 sick people while clinics in the 
rural areas are intended to cater for 10 000 people within 29-km radius. This thesis focuses on 
the rural clinics as poverty is more spread in the rural areas. So much money in the system can 
cause unintended effects like corruption a well-known problem in many African countries. In 
reality, there are few clinics in Zambia. In the 2000s the Zambian government had a total of 
1124 health facilities, represented by clinics in the model (Picazo & Zhao 2009). The target 
goal was to establish 1 385 health facilities, but this target where never achieved because the 
government allocated less financial resources to the health sector. 
 Further, the run show that if the Norwegian agencies continue to allocate aid funds using 
today’s policies, in theory the number of clinics will be more than the number of patients in 
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the year 2037. This will never happen in reality as this is just a model, but it demonstrates that 
the way development aid is managed today is not effective and therefore can produce 
unintended results.  
4.3.3 Education sector, 7.07 percent 
Millions of children do not have access to basic education in Zambia and million adults are 
illiterate because they have never got any education. According to Norad, they are all being 
deprived their basic human right: The right to education (Norad 2011). In order to ensure that 
many children receive education, Norway offer development aid in terms of budget support 
directly to the government of Zambia for the education sector. This support is represented in 
the model in terms of building more school.  
 
The run shows that because of the financial resources allocated to this sector, many schools 
are built. As a result of this, the number of students attending school increases exponentially 
and so is the general education level of the population. The initial value for the education 
level was 30 and by 2050, the level of education will increase to 49. An educated population 
contributes positively to the work force. And this will increase the domestic earnings and thus 
contribute to economic growth. 
 The problem with this policy is that it is not effective. According to the simulation run, there 
are more financial resources allocated than what is need. This is indicated by the number of 
students per school. From 1960-1963 there were enough schools each accommodating 1000 
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students per year. The number of students started to increase in 1964 and by 1973 the schools 
had the highest number of student of 1 288. This indicated the need for building more schools. 
As the schools were built, the number of students per school started to decrease reaching the 
desired number of students of 1000 in 1988. But, schools continued to be built because the 
resources were available. This leads to the further reduction in the average number of students 
per school. As the run shows, from 1990- 2050 the average number of students per school will 
be between 984-777 students. The average number students per school with this policy are 
949. In order to achieve the target number of students per school, the resources for this sector 
should be slightly reduced.  
According to UNDP 2011, the recommended students per classroom per teacher are a 
maximum of 40 pupils leading to 1000 student per school. This recommendation is however 
not considered by many schools as there are normally more students than the recommended 
number. The number of students needed per school normally exceeds 1000. This means that 
the Zambian government builds fewer schools than what is portrayed in the run. To give an 
example, there were 55 government schools in 1996 (Zambia Central Statistcal Office 2006). 
This means that the excess money for building more school end put in the hands of corruption 
leaders and government officials. 
4.3.4 Summary of the second run, Today’s policies 
Input, decision variables Output 
Economic sector, 5.41% 
 
The allocation contributed to a slight increase in the number 
of works, the average of 15.8 percent. There is a gap of 9.2 
percent which requires more financial resources in order to 
achieve the target rare of 25 percent. 
Health sector, 3.86% 
 
The policy is not effective. Too much aid funds  allocated 
which leads to building of many clinics than needed. This 
leads to fewer patients per clinic than the desired 10 000.  
Education sector 7.07 The allocation is more than what is needed because the 
average number of students per school is 949 which below 
the required number of 1000 students. 
 
This run shows that the way development is managed today is not effective as the aid funds is 
not producing the intended results. This does not seem to bather the norwegian aid agencies 
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since the the policies are not evaluated. The policy makers have little insight to what polices 
that works and what doesn’t. The agencies does not seem to be interested in achieving the best 
effect for the money and this may be because the policies are based on political or industrial 
reasons. Zambia is know for its mining industry like cooper and other industrial minerals. If 
the policies are not based on economic reasons, they fail because the poverty reduction 
problem is complex and the behavior of the system cannot be easily predicted by using 
traditional analytical tools. With simulation it is easier to understand the behavior through 
experiments. Because the norwegian aid agencies has not adopted a dynamic BSc, they  have 
no opportunity to experiment with their policies and to evaluate the consequences of each 
policies before they are implemented. It is clear that today’s policies has to be changed in 
order to promote economic growth and thus reducing the poverty level in Zambia. The 
economic sector should be allocated more resources than its receiving today. Both the 
education and the health sector should be allocated less than what is allocated today. This will 
be discussed in details in section 4.5. The following section will evaluate the policies of 
allocating equal share to all the three sectors. Try-and-error method will be used in order to 
find more effective distribution. However, it not expected that equal share will be an effective 
policy for all the sectors. The intention is to study how the system reacts. 
4.4 Third scenario, equal share for all sectors 
The third run is about testing the first policy of the Norwegian development cooperation 
system of allocating equal share of development aid to all the sectors. As discussed in the 
second scenario, the economic sector needed more than 5.41 percent while the education and 
health sector need less. The intention of this run is to study how the three sectors react to 
receiving the same amount of financial resources. The percentage of aid allocated per sector 
will be attained by using try- and -error method. The initial value of the financial resources 
and all the other assumptions made in the second scenario remain the same. The only changes 
are the share allocated per sector. The results from this run will be compared to the results 
from the second scenario. 
4.4.1 Economic sector, 5.5 percent 
As discussed earlier in the second run, 5.41 was not enough to increase the employment rate 
up the desired rate of 25 percent. Increasing the allocation to 5.5 percent was chosen because 
it was effective for the education sector as discussed later. However, it makes no visible 
difference for the economic sector as the graph below shows. But, there is a marginal increase 
of few workers as discussed below.  
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This run shows the effect of allocating 5.5 percent of the financial resources to the economic 
sector. The graph shows an exponential increase in the number of workers. The initial number 
of workers in 1960 was 825 000. The number of workers started to decrease from 1961 until 
1979. This indicated the need for funds. Additional 0.09 percent was allocated and then the 
number of workers started to increase again from 1980 throughout the simulation period. By 
2050 they will be 2 804 812 compared to 2 794 075 in the second scenario where 5.41 percent 
was allocated. This means that they was an increase of 10 737 workers at the end of the 
simulation period, an average of 32 workers per year. 
 
The actual fraction of the working population and the number of workers entering the work 
force are shown separately to get a better view of the effect of increasing the allocation from 
5.41 percent to 5.5 percent. 
As shown in the graph below, it looks exactly like the run from the second scenario. This is 
because the effect of increasing the allocation from 5.41 to 5.5 percent is marginal. But, there 
is a slight increase in the actual fraction of the working population. 
The fraction is 25 percent from 1961 until 1963 and from 1964 it starts to fall until 1991. 
Additional resources were allocated and then the fraction started rising slightly again. By 
2015 they will be 15.6 percent against 14.6 percent workers in the second scenario. By 2050 
they will be 16.9 percent compared to 16.8 percent from the previous scenario. The average 
fraction of actual workers has increased from 15.8 percent to 16.2 percent, an increase of 0.4 
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percent. The gap is reduced from 9.2 percent to 8.8 percent. This sector still needs more 
money to close the gap. 
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 The effect on the people entering the work force is shown in the graph above. Allocation of 
financial resources resulted in the increase of the number of people entering the work. The 
initial number of entering the work force in the 1960 was 17 983 and this increased at a low 
rate until 1976. Because of the available of financial resources, there was a higher increase 
from 1977 and the number of people continued to increase. By 2050, they will be 125 632 
workers. The average number of people entering the work force per year were 73 585 people 
compared to 72 408 people from the previous scenario. This means an increase of 1 177 
people. 
4.4.2 Health sector, 5.5 percent 
The run shows that as the number of clinics increases, the number of sick people reduces and 
the level of health increases. However, the allocation of 5.5 percent of the financial resources 
leads to building of many clinics than needed. This is not surprising as it is already known the 
3.86 percent from the second scenario was too much. More funds led to the increase in the 
number of clinics and the result was that the number patients per clinic decreases. This leads 
to fewer patients than the desired number of 10 000 sick people per clinic. On average there 
were 451 patients per clinic with this policy. The policy of allocating equal share is not 
effective for this sector. The allocation should be reduced. 
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4.4.3 Education sector, 5.5 percent 
Allocating 5.5 percent of the financial resources to the education sector is an effective policy 
because it produces the desired results concerning the number of schools and the average 
number of students required per school of 1000 as discussed in the third scenario.  
The run shows that the number of schools increases as the number of students increases. As a 
result of this, the level of education also increases. The run shows an exponential growth 
behavior for the number of schools, number of students and the education level. The number 
of students per school however, shows growth with overshoot behavior which is caused by a 
delay in building new schools. 
 
In the 1960, there were enough schools serving 1000 student per school. From 1961 to 1976 
the number of students increased and there were therefore fewer schools compared to the 
students, the average number of students per school were between 1201 and 1658 which is 
more than what is desired. This indicated the need for more schools. More schools were built 
and from 1977 to 2013 the number of student per school reduced to a desired number. The run 
shows that the number of students per school was between 1185 and 1002. The optimal 
number of students per school is attained in the year 2013 of 1002 students before the number 
start decreasing. The further decrease in the number of students is because more schools 
continued to be build, the number of students between the year 2014 and 2032 will be 901-
999. This number is still acceptable as it is not so far from the desired number. However, from 
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2033-2049 the number of students per school will reduce even further. They will be 800-895 
students per school. The policy can be revised then to reduce the amount of funds allocated to 
this sector in order to reduce the building of more school. All in all, allocation 5.5 percent of 
the financial resources is appropriate for this sector because it produces the desired outcome 
compared to 7.07 percent of today’s policy. The average number of students per school with 
this policy is 1056 throughout the simulation period.  
4.4.4 Summary of the third run, equal distribution to all the sectors 
Input, decision variables Outcome 
Economic sector, 5.5 % 
 
A slight increase in the number of workers reducing the gap from 
9.2 percent to 8.8 percent. More financial resources is need to 
close the gap. 
Health sector, 5.5 % 
 
 Ineffective policy for this sector. Too much financial resources 
in the system which leads to building of more clinics. This leads 
to a reduction in the number patients per clinic. There are 451 
patients per clinic on average compared to the desired 10 000. 
Education sector, 5.5 % Effective policy for this sector because it produces the desired 
results. The average number of students per school is 1056 which 
is closs to the desired number of 1000 per school.  
The policy of allocation equal share to all sectors does not work because different sectors 
have different needs. This policy only works for the education sector as it produces the 
required results. 
4.5 Fourth scenario, uneven distribution 
This run is intended to test the unequal allocation of aid among sectors. From the previous run 
we have seen that allocating 5.5 percent of the financial resources to the education sector 
produce the desired results therefore the same percentage will be used in this run. We saw 
also that allocating 5.5 percent of the financial resources to the health sector were more than 
needed, so the allocation for this sector has to be reduced. Further, the run from the third 
scenario shows that the economic sector needs more that 5.5 percent. The percentages for the 
economic and health sector will be attained using a try-and-error method.  
4.5.1 Economic sector, 15 percent 
Increasing the share to the economic sector from 5.5 percent to 15 percent produces the 
desired results. The runs shows that the number of workers creases exponentially from the 
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initial value of 825 000 to 3 079 296 workers by the end of the simulation period. 
 
Comparing the effect of this policy to the previous of allocating 5.5 percent, the number of 
workers has increased from 2 804 812 to 3 079 296, an increase of 274 484 workers. This 
increase represent 8.9 percent and it closes the working gap of 8.8 from the previous run were 
5.5 percent was allocated.  
Concerning the actual fraction of the working population shown by the run below, the 
allocation has resulted in increasing the fraction to the desired level by 2050. The fraction is 
25 percent from 1961 until 1963 and from 1964 it starts to fall until 1995. This indicated a 
need for more resources in order to increase employment. It takes time to recognize the 
impact of the financial resources. From 1996 the fraction starts slightly rising again until the 
end of the simulation period. By 2015 they will be 25.1 percent which is the desired fraction 
of actual workers. This is a goal seeking behavior derived from a negative feedback loop. The 
financial resources act to bring the system in line with the desired goal of 25 percent. The gap 
of 8.8 percent from the third run will therefore be closed at by 2050 and they will be no need 
for more financial resources for this sector. 
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4.5.2 Health sector, 1 percent 
The run shows that the number of sick people reduces as the number of clinics increase. The 
health level of the general population also increases as many people are getting treated. The 
most effective policy for this sector is to allocate 1 percent of the financial resources. The 
average number of patients per clinic shows an oscillation pattern in the beginning of the 
simulation period because there is a delay in building new clinics. In 1960 there were enough 
clinic to serve 10 000 patients per clinic. Because the population increases, the number of 
patients also increased. From 1961- 1965 the average number of patients per clinic were 
between 11 100- 11 430. This indicated a need for more clinic and more were built. Because 
of more clinics, the number of patients per clinic reduced from the year 1966-2002, the runs 
shows that they were between 7 263-9 985 patients in that period. This put a stop on the 
building of more clinics and the number of patients increased again from 2003-2050, ranging 
between 10 127-12 804 patients per clinic, indicating a need for more clinics. Over-all, the 
average number of patients throughout the simulation period is 10 449. This is not so far from 
the desired number of patients per clinic of 10 000. All in all, this policy produces the desired 
results. It can be revised in the year 2050, to increase the allocation in order to build more 
clinic as it is assumed that the number of patients will be increasing as the population 
increases. 
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4.5.3 Education sector, 5.5 percent 
 
As discussed in the third scenario, allocating 5.5 percent of the financial resources to the 
education sector is an effective policy because it produces the desired results concerning the 
number of schools and the number of students required per school. 
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The run shows that the number of schools increases as the number of students increases. As a 
result of this, the level of education also increases. The run shows an exponential growth 
behavior for the number of schools, number of students and the education level. The number 
of students per school however, shows growth with overshoot behavior which is caused by a 
delay in building new schools. In the 1960, there were enough schools serving 1000 student 
per school. From 1961 to 1976 the number of students increased and there were therefore 
fewer schools compared to the students, the average number of students per school were 
between 1201 and 1658 which is more than what is desired. This indicated the need for more 
schools. More schools were built and from 1977 to 2013 the number of student per school 
reduced to a desired number. The run shows that the number of students per school was 
between 1185 and 1002. The optimal number of students per school is attained in the year 
2013 of 1002 students before the number start decreasing. The further decrease in the number 
of students is because more schools continued to be build, the number of students between 
2014 and 2032 will be 901-999. This number is still acceptable as it is not so far from the 
desired number. However, from 2033-2049 the number of students per school will reduce 
even further. They will be 800-895 students per school. The policy can be revised then to 
reduce the amount of funds allocated to this sector in order to reduce the building of more 
school. All in all, allocation 5.5 percent of the financial resources is appropriate for this sector 
because it produces the desired outcome compared to 7.07 percent of today’s policy. The 
average number of students per school with this policy is 1056 throughout the simulation 
period.  
4.5.4 Summary of the fourth run, unequal distribution 
Input, decision variables Outcome 
Economic sector, 15% 
 
This policy is effective because it produces the desired results. 
The fraction of actual working will be 25.1 percent by 2050 and 
therefore no working gap. 
Health sector, 1 % 
 
 This is the most effective policy for this sector. There is an 
average of 10 447 patients per clinic for the whole simulation 
period. Not far from the desired target of 10 000 patients pr 
clinic. 
Education sector, 5.5 % Effective policy for this sector, the average number of students is 
1056 which is not so far from the desired outcome of 1000 
students per school. 
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The more effective policy is to allocate unequal shares among the three sectors. The share for 
economic sector was the largest because there was a big gap between the actual working 
population and the desired working population. In addition, there are higher expenses 
involved in creating jobs than building of schools and clinics. The education sector should 
receive more than the health sector.  
This feedback should be incorporated in the Zambian national plan for development. This will 
lead to changes in the Norwegians policies of aid allocation. 
The results from all the runs are based on both real figures from Norad and estimates since not 
all the information need was available. Because of that the results does not represent the real 
world, but it demonstrates how decision makers can use a dynamic BSc to evaluate the 
consequences of different policies before they are implemented. And further, how policies can 
be changed. 
 5. Results and conclusion 
5.1 Main findings from the scenarios 
The purpose of the simulation was to evaluate the dynamic behavior of the development aid 
per sector and the consequences of the policies on poverty reduction from 1960 to 2050. 
Policies have been evaluated in section 4 and the main results are as follows; 
1) The Norwegian agencies have to provide development aid to all the three sectors as 
they all contribute to economic development. The baseline run concluded that without 
financial resources allocated, they will be no economic development in the country 
and this will lead to more poverty.  
2) The way development is managed today is not effective as the aid funds is not 
producing the intended results. These policies need to be changed. The education 
sector is receiving the largest share followed by the economic sector and lastly the 
health sector. The aid allocation to both the education and health sector is more than 
needed which leads to unnecessary building of more schools and clinics. The 
economic sector is not allocated enough funds to increase the employment rate to the 
desired level of 25 percent.  
3) The policy of allocation equal share to all sectors is not effective because different 
sectors have different needs. 
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4) The more effective policy is to allocate unequal shares among the three sectors. The 
share for economic sector should be the largest share because there is a need work for 
workers as there was a gap between the actual working population and the desired 
working population. In addition, there are higher expenses involved in creating jobs 
than building of schools and clinics. The education sector should receive more than 
the health sector because it is assumed that an educated work force earns a higher 
average salary which leads to more tax revenue for the country. This contributes to 
economic growth.  
The analysis was based on the average allocation of development aid for the last 10 years. It is 
between 3-7 percent per sector of the total aid as discussed above. It is assumed that other 
donor countries have the same allocation range for the three sectors. If I was to advice the 
Zambian government, all aid provided to Zambia should have been evaluated and not only the 
percentage from Norway. Further, it is not possible to analyze Zambia without development 
aid since the country has been receiving development aid since the 60s and the development 
plan of the country depend on aid. 
5.2 Conclusion 
The goal of this thesis was to create and demonstrate the benefits of applying a dynamic 
balanced scorecard to development aid. For research purpose, Norad was used as a case study 
and Zambia as an example where a dynamic balanced scorecard was applied. The 
interdependences between sectors where identified together with key variables for each 
sector.  Further, key performance indicators (KPIs) for the chosen variables were also 
identified and these were used as basis for the contraction of the causal loop diagram. This 
enabled the creation of aggregated DBSc models which portrayed both stocks and flows, and 
auxiliary variables. Finally, aggregated DBSc models were simulated in Vensim to evaluate 
the policies and their consequences. The decision variables were constructed in such way that 
the policy makers can change the values of the variables to observe the consequences of each 
policy.  The time horizon for the model was 90 years, from 1960 to 2050, as this was a 
sufficient amount time to capture the dynamic of the problem and to infer the consequences of 
the policies in the future. The model was simplified only to deal with the aid management 
problem that the Norwegian development cooperation is facing today.  
The model was tested by replicating the population reference mode in section 1 and by 
running a baseline scenario. The model was consistent with system theory and therefore it was 
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used to assess several scenarios of either allocating equal or unequal financial resources to the 
three sectors. The intention was to study the consequences of each policy on the sectors.  
The results from the scenarios were the basis of evaluating how policies affect poverty 
reduction. The effective way to reduce poverty is to implement policies that contribute to 
sustainable economic growth. This can be achieved by allocating development aid to all the 
sectors (economic, education and health sector) as they all contribute to economic growth 
through improving the work force. Unequal distribution of development aid is recommended 
as it seems to be more effective. This is because allocation equal share to all sectors is not 
effective as different sectors have different needs. According to the runs, it is recommended 
that the economic sector receives the largest share because of the high unemployment rate in 
Zambia and the expenses involved in creating employment is greater than for building schools 
and clinics. The education sector should receive more than the health sector because it is 
assumed that an educated work force earn a higher average salary which leads to more tax 
revenues for the country. This contributes positively to the economic growth.  
Aid effectiveness could benefit from better prioritization at the country level, concentrate 
efforts on sectors with greatest potential for development as mentioned above. The Norwegian 
agencies should support this prioritization by providing predictable budget aid. The Zambian 
government should prioritize their development plan according to the benefits from each 
sector and this will change the allocation policies in Norway as those policies are influenced 
by the Zambian development plan. The policies recommended are not final as there is no 
solution to the poverty problem. The policies have to be re-evaluated over and over again as 
there are other actors in the system with their only interests that can offset the intension of 
these policies.  
With today’s policies for the last decade (2001-2011), the education sector received the 
largest share followed by the economic sector. The analysis of these policies suggests that the 
poverty persistence is strongly linked to the way development aid is managed today. There is 
more development aid in the system than needed and due to the lack of an effective 
management tool, unintended effects like corruption and dependency are unavoidable.  A 
dynamic BSc will be a useful tool in assisting decision makers in evaluating the consequences 
of their policies before implementing them by using experimental computer models. This will 
promote learning about the dynamics of development aid and contribute to implementing of 
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more effective policies. Continuing with today’s policies sustainable development will never 
be achieved and Norway will provide development aid to Zambia forever.  
Effective aid plays an important role in reducing poverty and inequality, increasing growth, 
building capacity, achieving human development and accelerating achievements of 
Millennium Development Goals (OECD 2012). 
There is a correlation between aid and economic growth if aid is managed effectively 
(Andrews 2009). There is evidence that aid effectiveness improves sector planning, budgeting 
and government capacities, strengthens national systems, and contributes to results through 
more efficient and sustainable implementation of national policies, plan and strategies (OECD 
2012). The challenge is finding a balance between programs that score well on delivering 
short-term measurable results at expense of aid effectiveness and longer-term programs with 
sustainable development, but more challenging to measure. It is important to consider the 
holistic picture of reducing poverty and not focusing on single elements.  
Specifically for the health sector, effective aid can deliver improved health results. Available 
evidence suggests that aid delivered through sector-wide approaches can increase overall 
resources for health and this is correlated with improved health service delivery, better 
coverage and health population as an outcome.  
6. Limitations of the study 
This section discusses the limitations encountered during my research. Norad was used as a 
case study and Zambia as an example. Norad was the main source of data collection for 
development aid allocated to Zambia and for providing information about today’s policies. 
The data for Zambia’s development was attained from different sources. However, not all the 
necessary data for the study was provided from Norad. The intention was to conduct 
interviews with key decision makers per sector, but Norad didn’t have the capacity to allocate 
time to that. The different sources couldn’t provide all the needed data for Zambia either. 
Because of that, several simplifying assumptions were made and these limited the scope of the 
study. Some figures are estimates and do not depict reality. Because of this, all the reference 
modes described in section could not be replicated in section 4. 
Modeling is time-consuming iteration of tests, observations, and hypotheses.  Getting the 
expected outcomes was a challenging task of constant evaluation of the equations that 
represent the algebraic relationship between stocks and flows of the different variables. It was 
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fun when the model produced the expected behavior and very frustrating when it produced 
bazar behaviors. The experience was more frustrating than fun unfortunately as it was 
impossible to get the entire model to behave as expected. The stocks for the financial 
resources and the need backlog produced unrealistic behaviors and it was impossible to 
identify the source of the problem. Unfortunately, Vensim software has no technical support 
system (at least not in Norway) for helping users understand the connections between model 
structure and behavior. The simulation runs for these stocks were therefore not included in the 
analysis. This however, did not affect the results per sector. As it was only intended to show 
the incoming financial resources against the expenses of building more schools and clinics, 
and increasing employment. 
Another limitation worth to mention is that models are about modeling a specific problem and 
not the entire system, therefore some elements of development aid were ignored. The problem 
modeled in the thesis is the management of development aid within the Norwegian 
development cooperation system. The aggregated model constructed was intended to evaluate 
different policies on a few key variables per sector, a simplified version of the development 
aid sector. Modeling is just a simplification of the real world and therefore all models are 
wrong, but can be useful in assessing specific problems.  
The model did not incorporate all the endogenous factors determining the rate of population 
growth and economic growth. There are also more factors that influence the various sectors 
than the model portrays, but they were no considered. Other sectors that contribute to the 
development of a sustainable economic growth like the environment and energy sector were 
also ignored.  
The thesis did not consider all the development aid allocated to Zambia from other donors 
countries around the world. Norway contributes a small fraction of the total aid Zambia 
receives and therefore difficult to isolate the effect of only Norwegian aid. 
Additional work is needed to reduce the simplifying assumptions and expand the scope of the 
study to incorporate most of the endogenous factors and other sectors that contribute to a 
sustainable economic growth which leads to poverty reduction. Further, to get a more realistic 
view of the effects of aid, the future DBSc model should incorporate all development aid 
allocated to Zambia from different donor countries. 
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7. Appendix 
 
7.1 statistics for the model 
Development Aid allocated to Zambia per sector. 1991-2011 (NOK 1000) 
Sector 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
 
Economic development  
         
128660  
         
104889  
         
134019  
         
178983  
        
124285  
 
Education 
           
25165  
           
12386  
           
17459  
           
12670  
          
11248  
 
Health and social services 
           
46549  
           
29210  
           
20739  
           
55712  
          
49602  
 
Total 
         
200374  
         
146485  
         
172217  
         
247365  
        
185135  
  
 
      Sector 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 
Economic development  
         
106804  
         
128908  
           
89697  
           
37179  
          
17836  
 
Education 
             
8575  
           
12757  
           
35801  
           
44676  
          
58578  
 
Health and social services 
           
58231  
           
66903  
           
55711  
           
47026  
          
32499  
 
Total 
         
173610  
         
208568  
         
181209  
         
128881  
        
108912  
  
 
      Sector 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
 
Economic development  
           
37209  
           
48355  
           
43292  
           
58309  
          
73116  
 
Education 
           
65443  
           
91928  
         
106217  
           
98027  
        
130699  
 
Health and social services 
           
25117  
           
28893  
           
37181  
           
36956  
          
34499  
 
Total 
         
127769  
         
169176  
         
186690  
         
193292  
        
238314  
 Sector 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Economic development  
         
150592  
         
175007  
         
242549  
         
269937  
         
224410  
         
221519  
Education 
         
126536  
         
126994  
           
34438  
           
24681  
           
14411  
           
17533  
Health and social services 
           
43220  
           
38061  
           
29112  
           
25256  
           
25508  
           
17476  
Total 
         
320348  
         
340062  
         
306100  
         
319874  
         
264329  
         
256527  
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7.2 Equations and documentation 
(01) actual frac population working=SMOOTH3(Workers/Population, 5) 
 Units: People 
 The actual average fraction is assumed to be estimated based on a 5 year average. 
 
(02) availability of clinics=Clinics/(Population/22000) 
 Units: Clinics/Population 
 
(03) availability of schools=Schools/(Population/10000) 
 Units: Schools 
Adequate school availability is assumed to be one school for every 10000 people in 
the general population 
 
(04) avg annual salary=50000*effect of education lookup(Level of Education) 
 Units: NOK 
 Assume baseline average annual salary to be 50000. 
 
(05) avg clinic productivity=10000 
 Units: Patients 
Clinic productivity is measured in patients treated to health per year, assumed to be 
10000 per clinic per year. 
 
(06) avg length of employment=30 
 Units: Year 
Assume 30 year working career. It is shorter due to the low life expectancy of the total 
population and the more labor intensive nature of the work, resulting in physical 
exhaustion. 
 
(07) avg life of clinic=10 
 Units: Year 
 Assume average life of all types of clinics equals 10 years. 
 
(08) avg life of school building=10 
 Units: Year 
 Assume average life of all types of school building equals 10 years. 
 
(09) avg patients per clinic=SMOOTH3(Sick People/Clinics, 2) 
 Units: Patients/Clinic 
 Used a 2 year average to compute clinic capacity ratio. 
 
(10) avg students per school=SMOOTH3(Students/Schools, 10) 
 Units: Students/Schools 
Used a 10 year average to compute school capacity ratio. 
 
87 
 
(11) avg tax rate=0.15 
 Units: Rate 
 Assume average tax on income to be 15% due low average annual salary. 
 
(12) avg time to graduate=12 
 Units: Year 
 Based on studies secondary school - 12 grades. University education is not included. 
 
(13) baseline population=3.3e+006 
 Units: People 
  
(14) becoming sick=Population*frac population becoming sick 
 Units: People 
  
(15) becoming sick lookup( 
 [(0,0)-(100,0.1)],(0,0.0377193),(14.0673,0.0311404),(30.8869,0.0263158),( 
 50.1529,0.0214912),(63.3028,0.0179825),(75.2294,0.0153509),(99.6942,0.0118421)) 
 Units: People 
 
(16) becoming well=availability of clinics*avg clinic productivity 
 Units: People 
 
(17) beginning=Population*frac population beginning school 
 Units: Students 
 
(18) building clinics=((Financial Resources*frac to clinics)/cost per clinic)/time to build 
clinic 
 Units: Clinics 
  
(19) building schools=((Financial Resources*frac to schools)/cost per school)/time to build 
school 
 Units: Schools 
 
(20) change per 100000 Sick People=1 
 Units: People  
  
(21) clinic capacity ratio=avg patients per clinic/desired patients per clinic 
 Units: Patients 
  
(22) Clinics= INTEG (building clinics-retiring clinics, 66) 
 Units: Clinics 
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Assume that 20 % of the population needs medical attention. Initial population is 
3300000 and     the desired nr per clinic per year is 10000. This gives 66 as the initial 
nr of clinics. 
 
(23) cost per clinic=1.2e+006 
 Units: NOK 
  
(24) cost per new worker=effect of aid on entering working frac*cost per percent increase 
in workforce participation 
 Units: NOK 
  
(25) cost per percent increase in workforce participation=100000 
 Units: NOK 
Assume that it will require 100000 per one percent increase in the fraction of entering 
workforce. 
 
(26) cost per school=1.2e+006 
 Units: NOK 
  
(27) decreasing=(Level of Education*frac quitting) 
 Units: Education level [0,100] 
  
(28) decreasing health level=(Sick People*change per 100000 Sick People)/10000 
 Units: Health level [0,100] 
  
(29) desired frac population working=0.25 
 Units: People 
 Societal goal for workforce participation. A policy decision variable. 
 
(30) desired patients per clinic=10000 
 Units: Patients 
Assume that 20% of the population requires clinical services per year. Based on an 
initial population of 3300000, this indicates a need for 66 clinics to serve 660000 
people. 
 
(31) desired students per school=1000 
 Units: Students 
 Assume ideal number of students per school. 
 
(32) Domestic earnings=Workers*avg annual salary*avg tax rate 
 Units: Tax revenue 
  
(33) dropping out=Students*frac quitting 
 Units: Students 
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(34) Economic development funding source=1.4039e+008 
 Units: NOK 
Average external aid provided for economic development programs for the last 
decade, assumed to be increasing fraction of population participation in the workforce. 
 
(35) Education funding source=7.6082e+007 
 Units: NOK 
Average external aid provided for educational programs for the last decade, assumed 
to be spent on building schools. 
 
(36) effect of aid on entering working frac=effect of resources for employment 
lookup(resources for employment) 
 Units: People 
  
(37) effect of education lookup( 
[(0,0)(100,1.5)],(0,0),(24.7706,0.230263),(37.6147,0.335526),(49.8471,0.506579),(74.
6177,1.18421),(86.2385,1.41447),(100,1.5)) 
 Units: Education level 
  
(38) effect of health on entering workforce lookup( 
 [(0,0)-(101,0.05)],(0.308868,0.00285088),(10.8104,0.00416667),(25.0183,0.00526316 
 ),(36.7554,0.00570175),(50.0367,0.00592105),(63.0092,0.00657895),(69.1865, 
 0.00679825),(77.2171,0.00679825),(85.8654,0.00701754),(93.2783,0.00701754) 
 ,(100.382,0.00767544)) 
 Units: Health level 
  
(39) effect of resources for employment lookup( 
 [(0,0)-(1.5e+006,0.15)],(0,0),(192661,0.0197368),(399083,0.0269737),(605505 
 ,0.0289474),(940367,0.0309211),(1.22936e+006,0.0315789),(1.49541e+006,0.032897 
 ),(1.50459e+006,0.0256579)) 
 Units: Employment 
  
(40) entering workforce=(Population*frac entering work force)+effect of aid on entering 
working frac 
 Units: People 
Rate of increasing the work force is the sum of effect of health level and the additional 
impact of focused aid to increase employment. 
 
(41) expenditures=meeting needs 
 Units: NOK 
  
(42) FINAL TIME  = 2050 
 Units: Year 
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 The final time for the simulation. 
 
(43) Financial Resources= INTEG (increasing finances-expenditures, 2.47497e+008) 
 Units: NOK 
  
(44) frac entering work force=effect of health on entering workforce lookup(Level of 
Health) 
 Units: Rate 
This fraction represents the growth of the economy, as indicated by the number of new 
workers. 
 
(45) frac population becoming sick=becoming sick lookup(Level of Health) 
 Units: People 
  
(46) frac population beginning school=school start lookup(availability of schools) 
 Units: Students 
  
(47) frac quitting=0.2 
 Units: Rate 
 Percent of students who never complete their studies. Assume 2%. 
 
(48) frac to clinics=0.01 
 Units: Rate 
Fraction of total financial resources allocated to building clinics, assume even 
distribution initially. 
 
(49) frac to schools=0.055 
 Units: Rate 
Fraction of total financial resources allocated to building schools, assume even 
distribution initially. 
 
(50) frac to workers=0.15 
 Units: Rate 
Fraction of total financial resources allocated to economic development - 
operationalized as increasing the "frac entering work force," assume even distribution 
of resources initially. 
 
(51) graduating=Students/avg time to graduate 
 Units: Students 
  
(52) growth fraction=0.044 
 Units: Rate 
 
(53) Health funding source=3.1025e+007 
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 Units: NOK 
Average external aid provided for health improvement programs, assumed to be spent 
on building clinics. 
 
(54) improvement per 1000 treated=0.6 
 Units: **undefined** 
  
(55) increasing=baseline population*growth fraction 
 Units: People 
  
(56) increasing education leve=(graduating*knowledge unit per graduates)/100 
 Units: Education level [0,100] 
  
(57) increasing finances=Domestic earnings+(Economic development funding 
source+Education funding source+Health funding source) 
 Units: NOK 
Total Financial Resources are composed of external development aid and domestic 
earnings from taxes on labor. 
 
(58) increasing health level=(becoming well*improvement per 1000 treated)/1000 
 Units: Health level [0,100] 
  
(59) increasing needs=(cost per clinic*indicated new clinics needed)+(cost per 
school*indicated new schools needed)+(cost per new worker*indicated new workers 
needed) 
 Units: NOK 
  
(60) indicated new clinics needed=INTEGER(clinic capacity ratio)+1 
 Units: Clinics 
  
(61) indicated new schools needed=INTEGER(school capacity ratio)+1 
 Units: Schools 
  
(62) indicated new workers needed=Population*working population GAP 
 Units: People  
 This represents a shortfall of desired workers in the economy. 
 
(63) INITIAL TIME  = 1960 
 Units: Year 
 The initial time for the simulation. 
 
(64) knowledge unit per graduates=0.01 
 Units: Students 
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(65) leaving workforce=Workers/avg length of employment 
 Units: People 
  
(66) Level of Education= INTEG ((increasing education level-decreasing)/1000,30) 
 Units: Education level [0,100] 
  
(67) Level of Health= INTEG ((increasing health level-decreasing health level)/1000,30) 
 Units: Health level [0,100] 
  
(68) meeting needs=(building clinics*cost per clinic)+(building schools*cost per 
school)+resources for employment 
 Units: NOK 
  
(69) Need Backlog= INTEG (increasing needs-meeting needs,1e+006) 
 Units: NOK 
The sum total of all indicated social needs measured in monetary units. This is to 
facilitate comparison with available financial resources, regardless of application and 
to enable decision makers to investigate the consequences of their priorities. 
 
(70) Population= INTEG (increasing,3.3e+006) 
 Units: People 
 Initial population of 3300000 people 
 
(71) resources for employment=Financial Resources*frac to workers 
 Units: NOK 
  
(72) retiring clinics=Clinics/avg life of clinic 
 Units: Clinics 
  
(73) retiring schools=Schools/avg life of school building 
 Units: Schools 
  
(74) SAVEPER  = TIME STEP 
 Units: Year  
 The frequency with which output is stored. 
 
(75) school capacity ratio=avg students per school/desired students per school 
 Units: Students 
  
(76) school start lookup 
([(0,0)(5,0.5)],(0.01529,0.0109649),(0.030581,0.00657895),(0.504587,0.0504386 
 ),(0.856269,0.0767544),(1.49847,0.0833333),(2.49235,0.0986842),(3.63914,0.100877 
 ),(4.25076,0.105263),(5.03058,0.118421)) 
 Units: Students 
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(77) Schools= INTEG (building schools-retiring schools, 495) 
 Units: Schools 
 Assume that 495000 students require 495 schools at 1000 students per school. 
 
(78) Sick People= INTEG (becoming sick-becoming well, 660000) 
 Units: People 
 Assume that 20% of the population is in need of medical care as a baseline. 
 
(79) Students= INTEG (beginning-dropping out-graduating, 495000) 
 Units: Students 
Assume that students are in the 7-18 year range and constitute 30% of the population, 
but only half of them attend school (495000 students). 
 
(80) TIME STEP  = 1 
 Units: Year  
 The time step for the simulation. 
 
(81) time to build clinic=3 
 Units: Year 
 Assume a three year construction time for clinics. 
 
(82) time to build school=4 
 Units: Year 
Assume a 4 year design and construction period for both primary and secondary 
schools.  
 
(83) total funding allocation=frac to clinics+frac to schools+frac to workers 
 Units: NOK 
Indicators of policy allocation. This number may not necessarily sum to 100% if the 
decision is made to not use all annual resources in the year that they are given, 
essentially saving them for the future. 
 
(84) Workers= INTEG (entering workforce-leaving workforce, 825000) 
 Units: People 
Assume that the 15-50 age group is the working population, and that 25% of the 
population meet this criterion and are working under normal conditions. 
 
(85) working population GAP=actual frac population working-desired frac population 
working 
 Units: People 
A positive gap value indicates more focus on economic development. A negative gap 
value indicates no additional economic support required for the time being. 
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